The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Chapter 15 Page 403
ing the large and small supply bases. The Mujahideen dependence on
the large fixed supply bases meant that they had to defend them.
This provided a viable target set for Soviet air and artillery.
Although weapons and material were furnished free to the
Mujahideen in the essential safe haven of Pakistan, there were significant
costs to the Mujahideen in getting it to where it was needed.
Often, the issued material was not what the commander needed in his
area. So the material had to be traded or sold for what he needed.
Then, the material had to be transported. Transportation was usually
by commercial teamsters using donkeys, mules, camels or pickup
trucks. 1 Commanders and faction leaders who established their own
transportation systems discovered that it was cheaper and easier to
stay with the established teamsters and muleteers. Once the materials
were loaded and in transit, there were still taxes and fees to be
paid. Every time the supplies crossed into a different tribe or faction
area, there was a tax or tariff—often 10% of the goods. Mujahideen
groups located well within Afghanistan were at the end of the pipeline
and found that perhaps 40% of their material had gone to other
Mujahideen groups between issue and final receipt. Western nations
preferred to distribute aid in goods. Mujahideen leaders, particularly
in the interior, preferred cash. They could always buy the needed
mines, ammunition, food and material in the local bazaar. Saudi
Arabia usually provided cash as aid. 2 Often, the Mujahideen needed
more material than they were receiving through the factions and
raised their own funds to buy it. Gem stones and narcotics, two traditional
exports, provided some of these funds.
As the Mujahideen acquired more crew-served weapons, the
ammunition tonnages required rose dramatically. At the same time,
Soviet airstrikes on animal herds and their widespread use of
scatterable mines along trails and mountain passes killed many of
the transport animals. There was more demand for transport and
fewer animals to transport the goods. The United States tried to
solve the 'mule-gap" by providing Missouri mules. Unfortunately
1 Animal carrying capabilities are: mule-250 to 335 pounds [H. W. Daly, Manual of Pack
Transportation, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917, page 18]; camel-400 to
600 pounds [ Lewis Burt Lesley, Uncle Sam's Camels: The Journal of May Humphreys
Stacey Supplemented by the Report of Edward Fitzgerald Beale (1857-1858), Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1929, page 9]; and central Asian horse-215 pounds [William
H. Carter, Horses Saddles and Bridles, Baltimore: The Lord Baltimore Press, 1902, pages
262-263]. Donkey figures unavailable.
2 "The Logistics System of the Mujahideen"; unpublished government contract study writ-
ten in 1987.