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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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VIGNETTE 2<br />

AMBUSHED AT FARZA<br />

by Commander S<strong>of</strong>i Lal Gul<br />

In April 1984, <strong>the</strong> regional <strong>Mujahideen</strong> called for a shura (local<br />

council) to discuss local issues and decide on common approaches. S<strong>of</strong>i<br />

Rasul and myself were to attend as <strong>the</strong> local <strong>Mujahideen</strong> commanders<br />

from Farza. <strong>The</strong> meeting would be held five kilometers to our north in<br />

Estalif. We were accompanied by 28 <strong>Mujahideen</strong> armed with AK47s<br />

and two RPG-7s. Someone must have been working for DRA intelligence<br />

in our area, since <strong>the</strong> DRA knew about our plans and set an<br />

ambush on <strong>the</strong> trail near Farza.<br />

We left Farza while it was still dark so that <strong>the</strong> enemy would not<br />

see us. Our route took us between two hills near a DRA air defense<br />

battery position (Map 12-2 - Farza). We were about half way to Estalif<br />

at a point which we call Wotaq, when <strong>the</strong> enemy opened fire on us from<br />

<strong>the</strong> surrounding hills. A DRA force had set up <strong>the</strong> ambush during <strong>the</strong><br />

night. <strong>The</strong>re is no doubt that <strong>the</strong>y knew <strong>the</strong> exact route we would take.<br />

We went to ground in <strong>the</strong> kill zone and tried to find good fighting positions.<br />

<strong>The</strong> firing was fierce, we were totally surprised and we did not<br />

know <strong>the</strong> enemy strength and exact positions. Our return fire was<br />

ineffective and uncontrolled.<br />

As dawn broke, our situation improved slightly, but we were still in<br />

shock. I had no command or control over my men and <strong>the</strong>y acted as<br />

individuals trying to break contact and leave <strong>the</strong> kill zone. Enemy fire<br />

was still heavy. During a lull in <strong>the</strong> fighting, I managed to find a few<br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> sheltering in a ditch. I led <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> safety <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mountains<br />

in <strong>the</strong> west. Twelve <strong>Mujahideen</strong> eventually reached <strong>the</strong> safety <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> terrain folds and mountain valleys in <strong>the</strong> west. Two o<strong>the</strong>rs and<br />

myself were wounded. We remained hidden in <strong>the</strong> valley until we saw<br />

<strong>the</strong> ambush force leave that afternoon. <strong>The</strong>n we returned to <strong>the</strong><br />

ambush site where we discovered that 18 <strong>of</strong> our comrades were killed.<br />

Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir bodies were mutilated by <strong>the</strong> enemy and most had <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

clothing shredded. Late that afternoon, we moved <strong>the</strong>ir bodies for<br />

burial. I do not know if <strong>the</strong>re were any enemy casualties, but during<br />

Commander S<strong>of</strong>i Lal Gul is from Farza village <strong>of</strong> Mir Bacha Kot District. This is about<br />

25 kilometers north <strong>of</strong> Kabul. He was affiliated with Mojaddedi's Afghanistan National<br />

Liberation Front <strong>of</strong> Afghanistan (ANLF) during <strong>the</strong> war with <strong>the</strong> Soviets. Commander S<strong>of</strong>i<br />

Lal Gul concentrated his efforts on <strong>the</strong> Kabul-Charikar highway. [Map sheet 2886, vic<br />

grid 0350].

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