The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 298 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
In the fall of 1984, Khan Mohammad (my deputy) and I were both
away from our base at the same time. I was in Iran. Informants told
the government that we were both away and so the government
attacked our base in our absence. However, the day that the enemy
forces attacked our base, Khan Mohammad returned to our base. It
was five days before the feast of sacrifice (Eid-al-Adha). The enemy
moved from Delaram to the plain some 15 kilometers north of us—
just north of the main road. They established a base there. Since it
is desert, they could move in any direction. They attacked our base
the next day. There were only 70 or 80 Mujahideen in base at the
time Our SOP for defense against an attack was to spread the forces
over a large area at strong points in some 20 villages. The enemy
would usually attack from the northeast to the southwest through
the green zone to the base area. He would also send a flanking
detachment to the Pul-e Ghurghori bridge and lodge in the Radzay
Mountain to encircle my force and pin us in the green zone. My
force had to fight in the green zone because the surrounding desert
was too flat and exposed for combat. We fought the enemy in the
green zone by confronting him with multiple pockets of resistance
anchored in fortified fighting positions. When the enemy tried to
concentrate against one pocket, Mujahideen from the other pockets
would take him in the flanks and rear. The enemy could not fragment
his force to deal with all the pockets, but had to stay together
for security. We would let the enemy chase us from strongpoint to
strongpoint and attack him whenever we could. Eventually, the
enemy force would become exhausted. When their water and supplies
ran out, they would break contact and go home.
The enemy attack developed as usual and, by the end of the day,
the enemy force retired. Unfortunately, my deputy was killed during
the fighting. In Iran, I heard about the enemy attack, gathered what
Mujahideen were available and started back to our base. The
Mujahideen at the base evacuated their casualties to Qala-e Naw,
Sheshaveh and Radzay. Informants told the enemy that the base
commander was killed. They thought that I was dead and decided
that it was the time to destroy all the Mujahideen in the green
zone. I arrived on the third day after the opening battle. That night,
another enemy column arrived and deployed in the desert north of
us. I realized that they were going to attack us. We had one BM-12,
one single-barreled 107mm rocket launcher, six 82mm recoilless
rifles, five DShKs, three ZGU-1s, and 15 RPG-7s. I now had 120
men. In addition to my Mujahideen, there were HIH Mujahideen in