The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 406 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Although disinclined to dig in the hard, rocky soil of Afghanistan,
the Mujahideen soon learned the value of field fortifications against
Soviet artillery, armored vehicles and airstrikes. Field fortifications
came to play a dominant role in the war as the Mujahideen learned to
build sturdy, redundant, camouflaged bunkers and fighting positions
which ensured their survivability.
Finally, the Mujahideen were a tactical force with a tactical focus,
but, when the occasion demanded, they were capable of operationallevel
actions. Such actions as operation Gashay, Zhawar II and the
defense against operation Magistral demonstrated this capability.
Such actions were usually under the planning or leadership of former
officers of the Afghan Army. What the Mujahideen were not capable
of was transitioning quickly into a conventional force. After the
Soviets withdrew, the Mujahideen tried and failed to take Jalalabad
and Kabul by a conventional attack. These efforts ended in disorganized
chaos as the DRA found heart and battled on successfully. It
would be years before the DRA collapsed and the Mujahideen tried to
unite to rebuild Afghanistan.