The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 234 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen's prompt reaction to the enemy attack
saved the day. The Mujahideen had learned that enemy airmobile
assaults in a guerrilla-controlled area have little chance of success
when met with coordinated fire from multiple directions. Dr. Alkozai
had planned for enemy air assault and positioned weapons to deal with
that possibility.
On the other hand, the Soviet forces paid heavily for their
attempt to land small units in an area totally dominated by the resistance.
A heliborne attack may succeed when it is launched against an
enemy caught by surprise and unable to respond swiftly. However,
heavy Mujahideen ground fire should have convinced the Soviet commander
to abort his mission. Instead, he relied on gunship fire to
carry the day and was forced to withdraw from a hot LZ. He was
lucky not to lose some lift ships, particularly since his landing zone
was so close to the objective.
Soviet intelligence about their target appears to have been
good, but the Soviet commander lacked the complete intelligence
picture about the strength and location of guerrilla forces. If the Soviet
commander had inserted some forces to secure the high ground
overlooking Kanda before landing the bulk of his force, he might
have been able to suppress guerrilla crew-served weapons and accomplish
his raid.