The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Chapter 3, Vignette 2 Page 115
before. The figure of 200 dead and wounded seems high, but it was a
well-planned and executed attack.
DRA and Soviet intelligence efforts in the Kama area seem inadequate.
Commanders, like the narrator, operated from the same area
throughout the war and moved freely through populated areas, yet the
DRA seemed unable to react in time. The Soviets and DRA knew who
the narrator was, what he looked like and where he was from, but they
were never able to kill or capture him.
CHAPTER COMMENTARY
The Mujahideen fired from fixed, surveyed sites and from mobile
firing bases. The mobile fire base deployed in two phases. During the
day, the firing survey party would move into the area, determine
weapons positions, map locations, headings, intended positions for the
aiming stakes and firing data. At night, the firing party would arrive
in a jeep, meet with the survey party, set up their weapons, conduct a
quick firing raid and depart.
The Mujahideen also employed unmanned firing bases. Unmanned
firing bases were used against targets which were devoid of cover and
concealment. The Mujahideen would survey these points in daylight
and set up rockets on makeshift or disposable launchers. They would
connect these rockets to time-delay firing devices. The Mujahideen
would be well away from the area when the Soviet or DRA forces would
launch a search for them.
Shelling attacks had mixed results. When launched against military
airfields and garrisons, they occasionally destroyed military
targets of value. Further, they prevented the DRA or Soviet forces
from sleeping and depressed morale. When launched against cities,
they frequently killed innocent civilians. This cost the Mujahideen
potential supporters. As some civilians expressed it, "the government
oppress us during the day and the Mujahideen oppress us at night."