The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 404 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
these required more food, carried less and died more quickly than the
local variety.
Medical care and medical evacuation was a Mujahideen weakness.
There were few Mujahideen doctors, although established Afghan
doctors frequently treated Mujahideen casualties at great personal
risk. Some Mujahideen groups had a medic who had graduated from
a eight-month to a year course in Pakistan or other countries. Most
groups were lucky to have a graduate of a six-week first aid course.
Some French doctors worked inside Afghanistan while many other
western doctors worked in the border areas of Pakistan. If the wounded
Mujahideen managed to survive the harrowing trip to Pakistan, he
probably survived. However, a seriously wounded Mujahideen inside
Afghanistan usually died.
Tactics
Guerrilla warfare demands quantities of quality light infantry on
both sides. The Soviets never fielded enough. The Mujahideen were
natural light infantry They were hardy, tough, courageous and local.
They had high morale, the warrior spirit and excellent tactical intelligence.
They were naturals at the ambush and pursuit. They were
raised from childhood with weapons, but they lacked unit training and
discipline. Training varied from valley to valley and force to force. The
Pakistani ISI provided some training courses and the former military
officers from the Afghan Army who joined the Mujahideen tried to
train the Mujahideen to a standard. Still, the Mujahideen were not
trained to a standard and the quality of the individual groups was a
function of their leadership.
The Mujahideen had warrior spirit and their focus was on battle,
not easy LOC targets. They wanted noise, excitement, personal glory
and the spoils of war. The Pakistani ISI cajoled and threatened, but it
was difficult to persuade the Mujahideen to attack the lucrative and
easy oil pipelines when security outposts were available. 3 The
Mujahideen had some distinct tactical faults. If they were in their own
area, they tended to ignore local security and could be surprised. They
were very predictable in their selection of ambush sites and shelling
sites. The Soviets, however, seemed unaware of this predictability.
The Mujahideen would habitually reuse the same sites, but there is little
evidence of the Soviets exploiting this pattern with aggressive foot
patrols, site raids, mining or plotting artillery fire on these sites.
3 Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story, London:
Leo Cooper, 1992, 36.