The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 208 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
uninterrupted from dawn to dusk. However, the Mujahideen suffered
fewer casualties than the militiamen, who sustained losses from both
collateral damage and "friendly fire."
Following three days of heavy bombardment, a column of enemy
infantry and tanks arrived from the Kajaki side. Although the
Mujahideen groups assigned to cover this approach had left earlier, the
terrain did not support tank movement. A Soviet Movement Support
Detachnient (MSD) used road construction machines and demolitions
to open a way through the rocky approaches to Dehrawud for the tanks
and APCs. The Soviets conducted airmobile insertions of soldiers on
the heights overlooking the movement route to provide flank security.
By this time, the Mujahideen were too widely dispersed for effective
control. The contingents from Kandahar and Helmand were on
opposite sides of the Helmand River and could not cross it. Their
heavy weapons, such as the ZGU-1, DShK and surface-to-surface rockets
were also positioned on both sides of the river. Their fires could not
be coordinated. Five days after they killed the Soviet pilot on the
Helmand River, the Mujahideen realized that they had lost command
and control over the scattered detachments and could not deal with the
two-pronged enemy advance. Therefore, the Mujahideen groups withdrew
to their separate provincial bases by mountain paths.
The Soviet column from Kajaki reached Dehrawud and recovered
the body of the dead pilot. The Mujahideen had removed
his documents earlier. As the Mujahideen pulled out, the column
from Kandahar stopped at Khakrez and did not proceed to
Dehrawud. It conducted a number of search and destroy actions
in the area and returned. During the entire 45-day battle, the
DRA militia incurred the heaviest losses. Mujahideen casualties
were negligible. Mulah Malang states that the Mujahideen shot
down a jet fighter and 10 helicopters.
COMMENTARY: This Mujahideen seige was a conventional battle by a
guerrilla force. It ended in a tactical setback. Had the Mujahideen
established an operational command system in the region, it would
have been easier for them to coordinate their action in terms of time
and space: Lack of such an arrangement left a sizeable Mujahideen
force without operational support by other local groups, especially in
blocking the movement of Soviet/DRA reinforcements.
Guerrilla forces are best employed for actions of short duration.
Long, extended operations, such as this seige, asks a lot of unpaid
volunteers. The Mujahideen did assign detachments to cover the