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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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Page 158 <strong>The</strong> <strong>O<strong>the</strong>r</strong> <strong>Side</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mountain</strong>: <strong>Mujahideen</strong> Tactics in <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Afghan War<br />

were using helicopter gunships and o<strong>the</strong>r aircraft against us. Since<br />

we were scattered over a wide area in small groups, <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />

command and control over <strong>the</strong> battle was difficult and sporadic.<br />

Coordination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> actions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> many resistance groups became<br />

very difficult.<br />

<strong>The</strong> battle in <strong>the</strong> orchards continued until 1400 hours. As <strong>the</strong>y<br />

ran out <strong>of</strong> ammunition, <strong>the</strong> various <strong>Mujahideen</strong> groups withdrew in<br />

different directions and moved <strong>the</strong>ir wounded to safe areas. <strong>The</strong><br />

Soviets consolidated <strong>the</strong>ir advance through <strong>the</strong> green zone, securing<br />

<strong>the</strong> high ground commanding <strong>the</strong> approaches to Estalef. I pulled my<br />

men out to Shoraw, about three kilometers nor<strong>the</strong>ast <strong>of</strong> Estalef. <strong>The</strong><br />

Soviet/DRA column moved to Estalef and launched an intensive search<br />

<strong>of</strong> homes. <strong>The</strong> soldiers looted homes, destroyed property and set fire to<br />

<strong>the</strong> houses <strong>of</strong> suspected <strong>Mujahideen</strong>. Many people lost <strong>the</strong>ir livelihoods<br />

due to <strong>the</strong>ir actions. <strong>The</strong> Soviets stayed three days in Estalef<br />

and <strong>the</strong>n returned to <strong>the</strong>ir bases. <strong>Mujahideen</strong> casualties in my group<br />

were two KIA and 18 WIA. Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> casualties were from Soviet air<br />

strikes.<br />

CO1IMENIARY: <strong>The</strong> large <strong>Mujahideen</strong> concentration in Estalef, close<br />

to Soviet/DRA forces, was an extremely imprudent move. If <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> patrol had not provided early warning, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />

losses at Estalef might have been much higher. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />

deserve high marks for <strong>the</strong>ir quick reaction and rapid deployment<br />

along <strong>the</strong> road to Estalef. <strong>The</strong>y utilized <strong>the</strong>ir familiarity with <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

home area to quickly select effective fighting positions and <strong>the</strong>y used<br />

local terrain and vegetation to conceal <strong>the</strong>mselves from Soviet ground<br />

and air power. However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> suffered from lack <strong>of</strong> effective<br />

command and control which prevented <strong>the</strong> timely coordination <strong>of</strong><br />

counterattacks and countermeasures. Better command and control<br />

might have enabled <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> to hold <strong>the</strong> high ground dominating<br />

<strong>the</strong> Estalef approach and to prevent <strong>the</strong> Soviet entry. But <strong>the</strong><br />

well-armed and supported Soviet force was able to push its way<br />

through. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> were reluctant to become decisively<br />

engaged in a protracted battle with a much-stronger, better-supplied<br />

opponent. <strong>The</strong>y felt that <strong>the</strong>y had to survive to face this opponent<br />

over and over again. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> a structured, viable<br />

supply system hampered <strong>the</strong>ir tactical capabilities significantly.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Soviets and DRA deserve high marks for carrying enough<br />

forces for dismounted combat and for using <strong>the</strong>m aggressively. <strong>The</strong><br />

combination <strong>of</strong> overwhelming firepower and ground maneuver

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