The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Chapter 11, Vignette 1 Page 271
At Katapur, the local Mujahideen told us that Soviet troops
had chased the civilians into the mountains just north of Katapur
and killed many of them. During the fighting near Katapur, the
Soviets had left two of their dead behind. The Mujahideen expected
that the Soviets would return for their dead. My Mujahideen joined
other Mujahideen and we went to defend a canyon to the north of
Katapur. We laid an ambush on the high ground. Soon, a Soviet
detachment appeared looking for their dead. We opened up on the
Soviets and they left seven more dead behind. However, they retaliated
on the villagers and massacred civilians and even animals in
Balabagh and Katapur and then moved on to Fatehabad. The Soviets
could not dislodge the Mujahideen from the mountains and could not
find us in the valley, so they killed everything in sight. They established
three bases—at Balabagh, Fatehabad and Sultan Pur. The
Soviets launched search-and-destroy missions from these bases
against the adjacent villages. Many civilians had to flee west while
Mujahideen detachments went to their hideouts in the Tor Ghar
mountain. Mujahideen commanders calculate that the Soviets
massacred some 1,800 people during 12 days in the Surkh Rud. Most
of these were innocent civilians. The Soviets expected that they could
readily flush out the Mujahideen. Their lack of success led to frustration
and the Soviet soldiers ran amok—killing and looting. It was
the first Soviet operation in the area. They came looking for U.S. and
Chinese mercenaries and instead found frustration and an opportunity
to murder and loot.
COMMENTARY: During this stage of the war, the Mujahideen lived in
their own houses in the midst of the population. Their food, water and
shelter was willingly supplied by the populace. As a result, many civilians
died when the Soviets launched their operation. The large
number of reported civilian deaths could be a result of lack of officers'
control and unit discipline or deliberate policy. The apparent Soviet
plan was to separate the guerrilla from the populace by forcing the
populace out of the countryside. Later, most of the populace deserted
their homes in this area and fled to refugee camps in Pakistan.
This is too large an area to block and sweep as a single action and
the Soviets failed to segment the area and clear it a piece at a time.
This allowed many of the Mujahideen and civilians to escape the
cordon. The Soviet emphasis on the primacy of the large operation
instead of the well-executed tactical action worked to the Mujahideen
advantage. Mujahideen command and control was fragmented and