The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Chapter 2, Vignette 5 Page 85
Lack of reliable internal communications among the Mujahideen
combat teams led to a situation that could have turned disastrous. The
containment team did not contain the DRA tanks and pulled out immediately
after it saw the tanks bypass its position. The group helped the
assault team during the assault,' but this was not their assigned mission.
Had the group laid anti-tank mines in areas that the enemy
tanks had to pass over— particularly in the vicinity of the bridge over
the Kabul River and the river fords—it could have delayed the tank
column and allowed them to engage it more effectively. This would
have prevented the enveloping movement that almost encircled the
whole Mujahideen contingent.
Apparently, the DRA had not developed and rehearsed contingency
plans to deal with such a raid. This, and luck, helped the Mujahideen
escape heavy casualties. A more active reaction by the DRA could easily
have jeopardized the concentration of a sizeable Mujahideen force in an
area totally controlled by Soviet/DRA forces. Relying on tanks, the
enemy failed to deploy infantry with the tanks. Infantry are more effective
in the dark against guerrillas and provide protection to the tanks
against anti-tank gunners. At the same time, the Mujahideen failed to
take advantage of the tank column's vulnerability and use their RPG-7s
at close distance against the unprotected tanks. The Mujahideen had the
opportunity to kill more than the one tank they actually destroyed.
Fear of being cut off inhibited much of the Mujahideen action after
they successfully destroyed the transmitter. However, through good
leadership, Major Sher Aqa turned a threatening tactical situation into
a more manageable one and succeeded in pulling his men out through
the tank cordon.