The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 136 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
10 of the Mujahideen WIA. We killed around 100 in the brigade and captured
some 400-450 DRA soldiers. We also captured some 40 armored
vehicles, although not all of them were functioning We captured 10
trucks and some 600 small arms. The Kabul government was slow in
reacting to our attack, since they did not expect that the brigade's resistance
would collapse so quickly. After 1400 hours, the artillery of the
DRA 8th Infantry Division" began firing on the captured garrison from
positions in Qargha and the Kabul airport. However, they did not
employ any aircraft against us due to the presence of the ZSU-23-2s and
Stingers. We did not intend to hold the garrison area and had no desire
to remain under artillery fire, so we grabbed what we could and left. The
government never reestablished a unit at that garrison site.
COMMENTARY: Planning a seven-day siege within 15 kilometers of the
heavily garrisoned capital of Kabul is a high-risk option, but the garrison
evidently capitulated as soon as its commander abandoned it and
fled in a tank. The Mujahideen southern roadblock was evidently not
too effective since the brigade's tanks managed to blast right through
it. At this point in the war, the DRA's morale (which was never high)
was at a record low. The Soviets had begun their withdrawal on May
15th over this same road and were conducting few offensive actions.
The DRA felt like the hapless brigade watching their commander flee.
The Soviets were clearly preparing to abandon the DRA.
The Mujahideen, on the other hand, were practically giddy with
anticipation of the complete Soviet withdrawal. The Mujahideen had
not expected to win the war and now could sense victory Their actions
became more daring. However, after the Soviet withdrawal, the
Mujahideen began quarreling among themselves even more than usual
and the DRA resolve strengthened. The war went on.
Coordinating an attack by different factions with uncertain
communications from four directions is also a high-risk option which
chances fratricide. However, audacity prevailed and the Mujahideen
quickly destroyed a larger force.
The introduction of the U.S.-manufactured, shoulder-fired Stinger
air defense missile caused a change in Soviet aerial tactics. The
Soviets would not employ close air support forward of their own forces
if Stingers were present. Further, a Mujahideen rocket attack on the
Kabul airfield about this same time reportedly destroyed five SU-25
close air support aircraft and damaged three others. Mujahideen air
defenses and aircraft availability probably limited the Soviet/DRA
response to artillery fire.