The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 238 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Abdul Wakil and I survived. The Mujahideen [under Commander
Saznur] initially stopped the column from Dur Baba, but the column
coming from the Nazian Valley advanced quickly and captured Maro.
In my group, we three survivors were caught between two LZs. We
snuck out of the area and crossed the border into Pakistan and hiked
to the nearby village of Bazar.
When the enemy took Maro, many Mujahideen fled across the
border and assembled at Bazar (Tirah Agency in Pakistan).
Reinforcements from the HIH and IUA factions poured into the
area. Arab volunteers along with Talibs from religious schools also
came for the fighting. We launched a counterattack. The fighting for
the bases was so fierce that at times it was hand-to-hand combat. I
personally was so close to some Russians during the fighting that I
would recognize them today. The enemy left many vehicles behind
and many dead on the ground. The Soviets did not usually leave
their dead, but we counted 75 Soviet KIA. I do not know the total
number of Mujahideen casualties, but I do know of 72 Mujahideen
killed and wounded. The Soviets only held Maro for three days. They
burned and destroyed what they could and mined the area before
they withdrew.
COMMENTARY: The Soviet air assault raids on mountain base camps
usually lasted for one to three days. As in this instance, the Soviets
preferred to have ground forces involved to link up 'with the air
assault forces. They tried to seize the area, destroy as much of
the base as possible, lay down mines and depart. And, they tried to
avoid getting trapped in the mountains fighting the Mujahideen on
their turf. As in Zhawar and Magistral, the Mujahideen initially
retreated, regrouped and reinforced and then launched a punishing
attack. The close proximity of this base to Pakistan allowed the
Mujahideen to do this. The Soviet planning and execution of this
action was well done, but they apparently were late in withdrawing
and had to fight a running withdrawal.
The Mujahideen distribution of forces on the two axes was uneven
and the air assault prevented the Mujahideen from employing a
reserve against the threatened axis. Part of the maldistribution is
due to the fact that various factions of various strengths were in the
area and missions were assigned by faction, not by strength.