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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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Chapter 3, Vignette 1 Page 111<br />

COMMENTARY: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> were able to fire on <strong>the</strong> garrison<br />

over a two-hour period since <strong>the</strong>y periodically shifted firing positions<br />

to avoid return fire. <strong>The</strong> Soviets did not push out any night patrols<br />

to find <strong>the</strong> firing positions but only replied with artillery fire. <strong>The</strong><br />

artillery fire did no good. Apparently, <strong>the</strong> garrison commander had<br />

not surveyed potential and actual <strong>Mujahideen</strong> firing positions to<br />

counter <strong>the</strong>m.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> rendezvous point was located in one <strong>of</strong> three<br />

escape routes into <strong>the</strong> mountains from Kama District. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, it is<br />

adjacent to a likely blocking position which <strong>the</strong> Soviets used during<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir periodic block and sweep operations. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> were<br />

caught downhill from <strong>the</strong> Soviet blocking force and could not escape.<br />

As usual, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> were severely hampered by <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong><br />

portable, short-range radios which would have allowed <strong>the</strong>m to<br />

coordinate <strong>the</strong>ir actions.

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