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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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VIGNETTE 3<br />

FALL OF SURKHAB BASE CAMP<br />

by Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif<br />

In early September 1983, we laid an ambush at Pul-e Khandari on<br />

Highway 157, <strong>the</strong> major road between Kabul and Gardez. At that<br />

time, <strong>Mujahideen</strong> ambushes were hurting <strong>the</strong> DRA/Soviet efforts to<br />

keep Gardez supplied. <strong>The</strong> enemy convoys always left Kabul in <strong>the</strong><br />

morning. We would get into position in <strong>the</strong> morning and wait until<br />

afternoon. If no convoys had shown by afternOon, we would quit and<br />

go back to base or go take a nap in <strong>the</strong> villages. <strong>The</strong> enemy finally<br />

figured out that we were reacting to <strong>the</strong>ir pattern and changed <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

pattern. <strong>The</strong>y started moving <strong>the</strong>ir convoys in <strong>the</strong> afternoon on <strong>the</strong><br />

assumption that we <strong>Mujahideen</strong> would have abandoned <strong>the</strong> ambush<br />

sites, since it was long past time for <strong>the</strong> convoy to arrive. As usual,<br />

we set up our ambush in <strong>the</strong> morning and waited. No convoy came.<br />

We left <strong>the</strong> ambush site and, by late afternoon, most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> had left <strong>the</strong> area. <strong>The</strong>n <strong>the</strong> column <strong>of</strong> some 180 trucks<br />

arrived. What <strong>Mujahideen</strong> were left in <strong>the</strong> village ran to <strong>the</strong> road and<br />

engaged <strong>the</strong> supply convoy which was hauling ammunition, fuel and<br />

food. We got part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> convoy and divided <strong>the</strong> booty among <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> groups that had representatives at <strong>the</strong> ambush. My<br />

group managed to capture some ammunition trucks, which we drove<br />

to our base near Surkhab in Durow Canyon.<br />

A few days later, a major enemy force moved against our base<br />

camps to retaliate for this attack. <strong>The</strong>y kept <strong>the</strong> area under seige<br />

for eight days. We had a total <strong>of</strong> about 300 <strong>Mujahideen</strong> from various<br />

groups in <strong>the</strong> area at this time. Our heavy weapons were DShK<br />

machine guns and mortars. We had expected some retaliation, so<br />

we had prepared defensive positions on <strong>the</strong> ridges on both sides<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> canyon mouth and laid some antitank mines in <strong>the</strong> area. We<br />

also laid an antitank minefield on <strong>the</strong> trail to <strong>the</strong> Tobagi plain<br />

(Map 11-3 - Surkhab2). <strong>The</strong> enemy column came through Pule-e<br />

Kandahari. <strong>The</strong>y attacked and lost some Soviet armored vehicles to<br />

mines on <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn and sou<strong>the</strong>rn approaches to <strong>the</strong> canyon.<br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> fighting positions on <strong>the</strong> high ground overlooked <strong>the</strong>se<br />

minefields, so we could fire on <strong>the</strong> advancing enemy as <strong>the</strong>y tried to<br />

Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif provided <strong>the</strong> previous vignette, [Mapsheet 2885, vic grid<br />

2577].

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