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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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Page 354 <strong>The</strong> <strong>O<strong>the</strong>r</strong> <strong>Side</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mountain</strong>: <strong>Mujahideen</strong> Tactics in <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Afghan War<br />

terrain so he did not present an air target and moved in <strong>the</strong> middle <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> column where he could best exert control. He gets low marks for<br />

following <strong>the</strong> guide down a stream bed without sending flankers to<br />

sweep <strong>the</strong> high ground. But, when his force was hit, <strong>the</strong> commander<br />

was able to ascertain that his column was not in immediate danger <strong>of</strong><br />

annihilation and shut down return fire. This allowed his men to determine<br />

where <strong>the</strong>ir ambushers were and to draw <strong>the</strong>m out <strong>of</strong> position.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commander ordered an escape to <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>ast and <strong>the</strong>n a move<br />

south in <strong>the</strong> safety <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mountains ra<strong>the</strong>r than retracing <strong>the</strong>ir route<br />

and risking ano<strong>the</strong>r ambush or drawing <strong>the</strong> relief column into <strong>the</strong><br />

Sepets area.<br />

CHAPTER COMMENTARY<br />

Successful counterambush is <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> careful planning, battle<br />

drills, rehearsals, information security, patrolling, current tactical<br />

intelligence, and deception measures. Movement <strong>of</strong> supplies needs to<br />

vary by route, time and composition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> supply column.<br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> supplies were moved on mule, horse, donkey, camel,<br />

truck and human porter. While some factions had <strong>the</strong>ir own transport,<br />

<strong>the</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> supplies were carried by contracted<br />

teamsters and muleteers. <strong>The</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> transport was high and a group<br />

with a reputation <strong>of</strong> getting ambushed would be hard put to find willing<br />

teamsters.<br />

In some areas, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> only had to transport ammunition,<br />

but in o<strong>the</strong>r areas <strong>the</strong>y had to transport food, clothing, and forage as<br />

well. Ammunition requirements for a small ambush by a 20-man<br />

group armed with Enfields, Kalashnikovs, an RPG-7, a PK medium<br />

machine gun, and five antitank mines, might exceed 375 pounds. <strong>The</strong><br />

weight <strong>of</strong> required ammunition shoots up dramatically as mortars,<br />

recoilless rifles and heavy machineguns are added.' Even if <strong>the</strong> ammunition<br />

was furnished free, <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> getting it to where it was needed<br />

was considerable and <strong>the</strong> wise <strong>Mujahideen</strong> commander carefully<br />

protected his supplies against interdiction.<br />

3 '<strong>The</strong> Logistics System <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong>", page 55, unpublished government contract<br />

study written in 1987.

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