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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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Page 38 <strong>The</strong> <strong>O<strong>the</strong>r</strong> <strong>Side</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mountain</strong>: <strong>Mujahideen</strong> Tactics in <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Afghan War<br />

every point. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> Soviets and <strong>Mujahideen</strong> fought for control <strong>of</strong><br />

Kandahar for <strong>the</strong> entire war. <strong>The</strong> Soviets knew that <strong>the</strong> road was not<br />

secure. And yet, <strong>the</strong> convoy commander did little to ensure <strong>the</strong> security<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement along <strong>the</strong> supply route. A preliminary road-clearing<br />

patrol could have preempted <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong>'s successful ambush.<br />

Instead, <strong>the</strong>ir entire operation was disrupted due to <strong>the</strong>ir failure to<br />

move <strong>the</strong> supplies to Panjwayee.<br />

Normally, <strong>the</strong> Soviets spaced APCs throughout <strong>the</strong> convoy as security<br />

vehicles. In case <strong>of</strong> ambush, <strong>the</strong> APCs would stop in <strong>the</strong> kill zone<br />

and return fire while <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> convoy caught in <strong>the</strong> kill zone<br />

would drive out <strong>of</strong> it. <strong>The</strong> portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> convoy not under attack would<br />

stop and wait for <strong>the</strong> APCs to drive <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> ambushers. <strong>The</strong>n, when <strong>the</strong><br />

ambushers had been driven <strong>of</strong>f, <strong>the</strong> convoy would reform and continue.<br />

This is why <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> established two ambush zones. <strong>The</strong>y did<br />

not think that <strong>the</strong>y would stop <strong>the</strong> convoy at <strong>the</strong> first ambush and so<br />

<strong>the</strong> second ambush was ready to hit <strong>the</strong> Soviet convoy again.<br />

On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, it took <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> about three weeks to<br />

decide to help <strong>the</strong> resistance forces in Panjwayee by hitting <strong>the</strong> Soviets<br />

elsewhere. Had <strong>the</strong>y launched <strong>the</strong>ir attack earlier, it could have forced<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir enemy to terminate his operation against <strong>Mujahideen</strong> groups in<br />

Panjwayee earlier.

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