The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Chapter 10, Vignette 4 Page 261
canals to Koh-e Safi. The attackers detected this exodus only toward
the end of the operation and opened fire on some escapees. Haji Abdul
Qader's men provided the rear guard and were the last to move out of
the area after blocking the Qala-e Beland sector for one week.
When the Soviets and DRA finally entered the area, thousands of
Mujahideen had escaped. Haji Qader claims that the Soviets only captured
about 20 armed Mujahideen and that the Soviet commander in
charge of the operation was reprimanded for his failure. He states that
the Soviets used several divisions, made elaborate plans and fired
thousands of artillery shells and flew hundreds of combat missions
without achieving much. Haji Abdul Qader's group destroyed 11 tanks
and APCs and inflicted dozens of casualties on the enemy. His losses
included seven KIA and 18 WIA. Most of his casualties came from helicopter
gunships.
COMMENTARY: Although the Soviet/DRA forces overran many
Mujahideen bases in Parwan and Kapisa Provinces, they failed to
destroy the Mujahideen forces which slipped out of the cordon or went
underground. The Mujahideen enjoyed freedom of movement and
maneuver in a large area until the Soviets and DRA finally penetrated.
The Soviet/DRA encirclement was very porous—as was the case
with so many large-scale cordon and search operations of the war—
making it impossible to trap Mujahideen forces. The poor performance
by the Soviet infantry and tanks against a determined enemy cost
them dearly. Instead of mounting coordinated infantry-tank assaults,
the Soviet forces seemed to use each element separately. While a combined
action could minimize the vulnerabilities of each element, a disjointed
action maximized the vulnerability of both elements in the face
of a resolute defense.
The Mujahideen built a series of covered bunkers near their prepared
fighting positions and these bunkers enabled them to survive air
strikes and intense artillery barrages. Most of this massive Soviet fire
destroyed civilians, houses and the agricultural system.
Lack of operational coordination among the Mujahideen groups
cost the resistance some major operational achievements. While the
Soviets failed to capture large numbers of Mujahideen or to destroy a
major Mujahideen grouping, the resistance missed a major opportunity
to inflict heavy losses on the Soviets. The Mujahideen focused on
escape, when they had many chances to bloody their enemy by resisting
on consecutive defensive positions in the area and by cutting the
Soviet withdrawal routes once they were inside Mujahideen territory.