The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Chapter 1, Vignette 11 Page 45
In the meantime, several gasoline trucks caught fire and the fire
quickly spread to other vehicles. The chain reaction set off several
explosions which threw burning debris on both sides of the road. We
scored direct hits on about 50 vehicles while many others were damaged
in explosions caused by the blown up trucks and gas tankers. The
action lasted 30 minutes. We withdrew before enemy aircraft could be
scrambled. The enemy did not pursue us.
This ambush marked the beginning of a continuous battle for
control of the western road to Kandahar. Until the Soviet withdrawal
in 1989, this road was under constant threat by the Mujahideen who
would set up road blocks, conduct ambushes, mine long stretches of
the road and demolish bridges, underpasses and viaducts using unexploded
aerial bombs. Faced with continuous Mujahideen ambushes
and attacks on convoys along the highway, the Soviet forces established
several security posts and fire bases in the area. They built a
major fire base at Kandahar Silo and another at Karez Slim in the
northern plain overlooking the Kandahar western highway.
The Soviets set three security outposts at the points where
orchards and the green zone stretched to the road providing concealment
for Mujahideen in ambush. They were established on both
sides of Pasab and at Hauz-e Madad (Map 10a Deh-Khawaja 1 in
Vignette 9). The posts were protected by earth berms. The road-side
security posts were connected to the main fire base at Karez Slim by
communications trenches which allowed safe, rapid reinforcement.
The twin Pasab posts were each manned by 10-15 men and each had
a tank, a howitzer and a mortar. The security post at Hauz-e Madad
was two times as large as the two Pasab posts combined.
The new security arrangement impeded Mujahideen movement in
the area. Repeated attempts by the Mujahideen failed to knock out the
Soviet outposts. Lala Malang sent for me and asked me to join in a
coordinated attack on the Soviet security posts in November 1985.
Mujahideen forces lacked the ability to knock out security posts since
they had to fight from exposed positions with little cover and they
lacked engineering equipment to neutralize mine fields around the
enemy positions. Therefore, the Mujahideen could not sustain pressure
on the outpost garrison.
We Kandahar Mujahideen decided to first enhance our tactical survivability
and then renew attempts to destroy the enemy security
7 Lala Malang was a well-known Mujahideen commander who was based in Pashmol (he
was killed during a major Soviet sweep of the Arghandab Valley in 1987).