12.11.2012 Views

The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Chapter 6, Vignette 2 Page 155<br />

ing, <strong>the</strong> women from <strong>the</strong> villages would bring bread and milk forward<br />

to our positions. <strong>The</strong> whole area was actively supporting us. <strong>The</strong><br />

inhabitants <strong>of</strong> Paghman, Oryakhel and Khaldari were feeding us.<br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> came from outside <strong>the</strong> area to reinforce us. Modir Zaher<br />

<strong>of</strong> Khaldari took nine wounded <strong>Mujahideen</strong> into his home. His wife<br />

cared for <strong>the</strong>m, nursed <strong>the</strong>m and applied dressings on <strong>the</strong>m. <strong>The</strong><br />

Soviets tried to bypass our ambush by moving on <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn route to<br />

Paghman through Qaragha. <strong>Mujahideen</strong> stopped this column at<br />

Dodamast northwest <strong>of</strong> Qaragha. <strong>The</strong> enemy <strong>the</strong>n tried to bypass <strong>the</strong><br />

Kwaja Musafer ambush by skirting around it, but <strong>the</strong> bypassing force<br />

soon fell into fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Mujahideen</strong> ambushes. <strong>The</strong> center <strong>of</strong> fighting<br />

was Kwaja Musafer and we stopped and held <strong>the</strong> enemy <strong>the</strong>re. After<br />

three days <strong>of</strong> fighting, <strong>the</strong> enemy broke contact and withdrew to Kabul.<br />

In my sector, we lost 13 KIA and many wounded. I personally know <strong>of</strong><br />

20 wounded, but <strong>the</strong>re were many more. <strong>The</strong> enemy lost 14 armored<br />

vehicles and trucks in my sector. I know that over 40 DRA soldiers<br />

were captured or defected. We captured hundreds <strong>of</strong> small arms<br />

during this battle.<br />

COM1VIENTARY: This is an example <strong>of</strong> good <strong>Mujahideen</strong> field cooperation—not<br />

always a feature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> war. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> cooperated and<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir overall formation streng<strong>the</strong>ned as <strong>the</strong> battle continued since<br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> came from all around <strong>the</strong> area to join in <strong>the</strong> fight. <strong>The</strong><br />

British noted that a good fight had almost a magnetic effect on <strong>the</strong><br />

warrior-tribesmen <strong>of</strong> Afghanistan and <strong>the</strong> Soviets learned that this<br />

trait had not disappeared over time. <strong>The</strong> Soviets and DRA broke contact<br />

after three days although <strong>the</strong>ir lines <strong>of</strong> communication were intact<br />

and <strong>the</strong> enemy was fixed in known positions. Firepower could not<br />

break <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Soviets and DRA would not commit <strong>the</strong><br />

necessary infantry to close with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> road to Paghman runs through a heavily-populated green zone<br />

and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> were able to select and fortify good ambush positions<br />

along <strong>the</strong> route. In this summer fighting, <strong>the</strong> trees and crops provided<br />

good concealment for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong>.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!