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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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VIGNETTE 8<br />

AMBUSH NEAR ABDULLAH-E BURJ<br />

by Haji Abdul Qader and Hap Qasab<br />

In October 1980, a Soviet column left its base in Bagram to conduct<br />

a four-day operation against <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> in <strong>the</strong> Nejraw District <strong>of</strong><br />

Kapisa Province. To get <strong>the</strong>re, <strong>the</strong>y crossed <strong>the</strong> Abdullah-e Burj bridge<br />

over <strong>the</strong> Panjshir River. <strong>The</strong> bridge is on <strong>the</strong> main highway connecting<br />

Bagram with <strong>the</strong> provincial capitals <strong>of</strong> Mahmoud-e Raqi and Deh<br />

Baba'Ali and o<strong>the</strong>r major towns including Gulbahar in <strong>the</strong> north and<br />

Sarobi in <strong>the</strong> south. Since this is <strong>the</strong> only bridge over <strong>the</strong> Panjshir<br />

River in this region, <strong>Mujahideen</strong> felt that <strong>the</strong> Soviet force would return<br />

to <strong>the</strong>ir base by <strong>the</strong> same route.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> based around <strong>the</strong> Abdullah-e Burj decided to<br />

ambush <strong>the</strong> column on its return trip when <strong>the</strong> troops were tired and<br />

more vulnerable. <strong>The</strong>y decided to hit <strong>the</strong> column while it was crossing<br />

over <strong>the</strong> bridge from Kapisa to Parwan Province. <strong>The</strong> Soviets would be<br />

most vulnerable when half <strong>the</strong>ir column had crossed <strong>the</strong> river and<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir force was divided by <strong>the</strong> river (Map 9 - Burj).<br />

Haji Abdul Qader and Haji Qasab jointly planned and executed <strong>the</strong><br />

ambush. <strong>The</strong>y decided to let <strong>the</strong> Soviet force move unopposed until <strong>the</strong><br />

head <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> column reached Qala-e Naw, about 3.5 kilometers southwest<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bridge. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> had watched <strong>the</strong> column depart<br />

and knew how long <strong>the</strong> column was. <strong>The</strong>y calculated that when <strong>the</strong><br />

column reached Qala-e Naw, half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> column would still be on <strong>the</strong><br />

north <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> river with <strong>the</strong> tail <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> column just south <strong>of</strong> Deh<br />

Baba'Ali. Haji Abdul Qader's group (about 150 men) would set up <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

ambush south <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> river along <strong>the</strong> Bagram-Kapisa road. <strong>The</strong>y would<br />

set up in <strong>the</strong> orchards and hills between Qala-e Naw and Abdullah-e<br />

Burj. Haji Qasab, reinforced with local <strong>Mujahideen</strong> from Commander<br />

Shahin's group (about 200 altoge<strong>the</strong>r) would ambush north <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> river<br />

between Abdullah-e Burj and Deh Baba'Ali. <strong>The</strong> two areas were part<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> normal AOs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two commanders. In both areas, <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> positioned <strong>the</strong>ir RPG-7s close to <strong>the</strong> road and <strong>the</strong>ir heavy<br />

machine guns fur<strong>the</strong>r back on dominant terrain. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> also<br />

supported <strong>the</strong> ambushes with a few recoilless rifles and 82mm mortars.<br />

On 5 October, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> secretly deployed into <strong>the</strong>ir designated<br />

positions and prepared covered positions for <strong>the</strong>ir anti-tank<br />

Haji Abdul Qader was a HIK commander in <strong>the</strong> Bagram area. Haji Qasab was a JIA commander<br />

in <strong>the</strong> Deh Baba'Ali area. [Map sheets 2886 and 2887].

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