The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 190 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
governMent post within range of heavy weapons."
The operational commander, General Rahim Wardak, radioed my
adjacent commander, Haji Zaman, and told him that the attack time
on the posts would be at 0800 hours, 23 October. When I returned from
my reconnaissance, Haji Zaman relayed this information to me. I
moved my raiding party into some ruins located one kilometer south of
the Kabul-Jalalabad highway in preparation for the next mornings
attack. I also set up an ambush near the highway to kill the patrol
that left the Khairokhel post and moved toward the Surkhakan bridge
every morning. My aim was to keep the area clear for my raid on the
Khairokhel Post.
At 0700, a group of about 15 soldiers left the government post and
started moving in the direction of Surkhakan bridge to set up security
checkpoints. My Mujahideen let them clear the village and, as
soon as they reached an open stretch of the road, opened fire from
well-concealed positions near the road. My ambush killed six enemy
soldiers and wounded a few others.
This action drew a heavy barrage from the enemy bases on either
side of Khairokhel. Artillery and tanks were firing from the Spina
Thana in the west and from Surkhakan Bridge Post on the east. At
this point I radioed a coded message to Haji Zaman saying "get the
dogs off my back." He immediately responded with heavy fire against
the enemy base at Spina Thana. Haji Zaman's group was ready since
it was 0800 hours, the time to start the attack.
Mujahideen fire on Spina Thana took the pressure off my
Khairokhel sector. For several hours, Task Force Gulf exchanged fire
with the Spina Thana base. Then, some direct hits on fuel drums set
the fort ablaze. Task Force Gulf then attacked the enemy base.
As Task Force Gulf launched its attack against Spina Thana, I
launched the main part of Task Force Hurricane against the enemy
positions around the Khairokhel Post. I kept a security detachment
east of the village to block enemy forces trying to enter the engagement
area. The coordinated attacks of Task Forces Gulf and Hurricane overran
the adjacent Spina Thana base and Khairokhel Post at about 1430
hours. My Mujahideen destroyed the tanks and APCs at the Khairokhel
Post and, while part of my group established a perimeter defense
around the captured post, the other part moved captured weapons and
equipment to my mountain hideout. This continued all day.
During the attack, the enemy was moving communist officials of
the Alingar District government to Jalalabad in a military convoy (at
this time, due to the ongoing Soviet withdrawal, the communist