The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 114 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Round after round of enemy fire slammed into the mountains, while
the Mujahideen mortars continued to fire from the valley between the
mountains. With the Soviet fire, the Mujahideen mortars and the
lightning, the night was practically turned into day. It was a spectacular
fireworks display.
I had stayed at Gerdab and had a cow killed and cooked. I
planned to welcome my returning heroes with a feast. They were
supposed to return at dawn and so all the arrangements for the feast
were ready as the eastern sky lightened. But, my men did not return
at dawn. They were pinned down by the heavy Soviet return fire. At
daybreak, Soviet helicopters and aircraft began flying over the area
and firing everywhere. I despaired that anyone would survive. I
promised Allah that I would donate a large sum of money to charity
if even half of my men would return. At 0800, my body guard, Juma
Khan, and I left Gerdab and climbed the mountain overlooking
Gerdab. I was using my binoculars, I saw a shepherd running toward
me. Everything was now calm. The aircraft had returned to the
airfield and the artillery had quit firing. I climbed down to meet the
shepherd. He brought me the good news that my Mujahideen had
survived and had returned to Gerdab. None of my Mujahideen were
even hurt! We had a very good feast.
Due to the heavy Soviet shelling, many other Mujahideen left
their areas. Our contacts in the Soviet camp later reported that helicopters
evacuated wounded and dead from Samarkhel to Jalalabad
airport. The helicopters made 12 trips. Our contacts told me that
there were at least 200 killed and wounded. This attack increased
Soviet activity and Soviet helicopters were out flying every day looking
for Mujahideen.
COMIVIENIARY: A lot of Mujahideen mortar firing was observed fire
from the forward slopes of a mountain with the gunner making firing
adjustments. The mortar crews in this attack would not have survived
the Soviet return fire if they had tried firing from the forward slopes.
Their reverse slope firing positions in the valley made it difficult for
Soviet artillery to reach the firing positions. The use of forward
observers to adjust fire is a mark of sophistication among Mujahideen
forces. However, the Soviet mortar battery commanders should have
surveyed these likely firing sites and had them plotted long before the
Mujahideen attack. Apparently, they did not. This is a step that fire
support commanders should take whenever their forces stop. This was
a permanent garrison, so such planning should have been done years