The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Chapter 2, Vignette 8 Page 95
ing the high ground south of the Lataband pass began to fire on the
enemy outposts below. The shelling confused the enemy as the three
teams of the assault group approached their outposts and launched the
attack. The battle continued into the evening and the assault teams
overran the enemy outposts. As the Mujahideen approached the outposts,
most of the DRA soldiers ran away and left behind an enormous
amount of ammunition and other equipment. We loaded what we
could on our mules and hauled it away. The enemy responded by saturating
the area in and around the outposts with artillery fire and air
attacks. We lost two mules to artillery fire and so withdrew at 2100.
We suffered personnel losses. The losses, in my own group were one
KIA and six WIA. We captured two DRA soldiers and lots of ammunition
and supplies.
COMMENTARY: The isolated highway security posts were extremely
vulnerable to attacks by Mujahideen who controlled the surrounding
high ground. The Soviets/DRA had insufficient intelligence or surveillance
in the immediate region. Furthermore, their contingency plans
to reinforce outposts or to react swiftly against Mujahideen attacks
were lacking or poorly executed. The forces in the bases seemed to
have a severe case of "bunker mentality" and passively sat out the
Mujahideen shelling and attack on the outposts. The Soviets and DRA
seemed particularly reluctant to move and fight at night. The
Mujahideen exploited this reluctance. Air support apparently was
slow in coming and was not very accurate at night.
In this example, the Soviet/DRA base forces waited until the outposts
were overrun and the Mujahideen were withdrawing before they
reacted. They reacted with artillery and air strikes—not maneuver
forces. The DRA in the outposts were left to their own devices. The
DRA forces were generally ill-trained and had poor morale. Most of the
DRA soldiers had been press-ganged into the army and had no desire
to fight their countrymen. Therefore, the DRA soldiers were more
interested in escaping than in stubborn defense and were quite willing
to abandon the ammunition and supplies of the outpost to the attacking
Mujahideen. The Mujahideen preferred to attack DRA outposts for
this reason.
Mujahideen dependence on these types of raids for weapons and
ammunition cost them casualties. The Soviets and DRA reacted with
artillery and air strikes when they could, but they did not continue
them all night long. This gave the Mujahideen the option of immediately
entering the camp to seize what material they could and then