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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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VIGNETTE 14<br />

THE FALL OF CHAGHNI BASE CAMP<br />

by Commander Abdul Razek,<br />

Haji Pir Mohammad, and Amir Mohammad<br />

Chaghni base camp is in Shahr-e Safa District about 10 kilometers<br />

from Highway 1—<strong>the</strong> main highway from Kabul to Kandahar.<br />

We normally set ambushes on <strong>the</strong> south side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> road, since <strong>the</strong><br />

north side is open between Shahr-e Safa and Kalat. <strong>The</strong>re was only<br />

one place optimum for ambush—a six-kilometer stretch where a<br />

dry river bed parallels <strong>the</strong> road way. We could hide many <strong>Mujahideen</strong><br />

in <strong>the</strong> high ground overlooking <strong>the</strong> road and escort vehicles<br />

could not cross <strong>the</strong> river bed to get up into our ambush positions,<br />

since <strong>the</strong> dry river banks were like sheer walls. Although no APC or<br />

tank could get across, we mined <strong>the</strong> area between <strong>the</strong> road and<br />

<strong>the</strong> river bed anyway. <strong>The</strong> high ground <strong>of</strong> Sher Alikhan <strong>Mountain</strong><br />

protected our withdrawal. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>re were no villages or villagers<br />

nearby to provide warning to <strong>the</strong> enemy. We built permanent<br />

fighting positions at this site and we ambushed <strong>the</strong> enemy at this<br />

site continually, but <strong>the</strong>y always seemed surprised. <strong>The</strong> enemy<br />

convoy would usually reach our ambush site in <strong>the</strong> late afternoon<br />

since <strong>the</strong>y left Kabul about 0800. <strong>The</strong> enemy usually sent tanks,<br />

BMPs and APCs to escort <strong>the</strong>ir convoys. We normally positioned our<br />

heavy weapons on favorable ground higher up and positioned our<br />

small arms forward.<br />

At <strong>the</strong> point that we usually laid our ambushes, <strong>the</strong>re was one<br />

road that intersected our area. It had to cross <strong>the</strong> river bed, but we<br />

usually mined that road as well for good measure. <strong>The</strong> normal reaction<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy convoy, when ambushed, was to drive <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> road<br />

to <strong>the</strong> north to get out <strong>of</strong> range <strong>of</strong> our weapons. <strong>The</strong>y never tried to<br />

attack us. <strong>The</strong>ir trucks would be burning and destroyed, everything<br />

would be in chaos and everyone was looking to his own survival.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re was no coordinated response. Escort tanks and APCs would<br />

Abdul Razek was a major commander in <strong>the</strong> Kandahar area. Several <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> current Taliban<br />

leaders once worked for him. His command included Shahr-e Safa District nor<strong>the</strong>ast <strong>of</strong><br />

Kandahar. [Map sheet 2280, vic grid 6016].<br />

Haji Pir Mohammad was a subgroup commander for Abdul Razek in <strong>the</strong> Kandahar area.<br />

Amir Mohammad was a combatant in Abdul Razek's group.

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