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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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VIGNETTE 3<br />

RAID ON BAGRAMI DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS<br />

by Commander Shahabuddin<br />

In July 1983, local units <strong>of</strong> all seven major factions united to raid<br />

<strong>the</strong> Bagrami District Headquarters to <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>ast <strong>of</strong> Kabul. (No<br />

Map) We assembled about 250 <strong>Mujahideen</strong> armed with six 82mm mortars,<br />

nine recoilless rifles, and eight RPG-7s. We assembled at my base<br />

at Yakhdara, made our plans and <strong>the</strong>n spread our forces out in <strong>the</strong> villages.<br />

We assigned 100 <strong>Mujahideen</strong> to route security and posted <strong>the</strong>m<br />

prior to moving our main raiding forces to Bagrami and Qal-e<br />

Ahmadkhan. <strong>The</strong>se towns are in <strong>the</strong> suburbs just outside <strong>of</strong> Kabul<br />

and are part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inner security belt <strong>of</strong> Kabul. <strong>The</strong> Bagrami 40-man<br />

assault group had eight RPG-7s, three recoilless rifles and two mortars.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y were to attack <strong>the</strong> district headquarters from three directions.<br />

I led <strong>the</strong> assault group at Qal-e Ahmadkhan. I had 50 men-10<br />

<strong>of</strong> which I used for flank protection and 40 for <strong>the</strong> raid. I also attacked<br />

from three directions. As we approach Qal-e Ahmadkhan, we were<br />

stopped by a small outpost. We overran it. <strong>The</strong>n we attacked one <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> many security outposts in <strong>the</strong> village. We overran this outpost<br />

killing 25 and capturing eight DRA soldiers. We also captured 14<br />

Kalashnikovs and a telephone set. <strong>The</strong> Bagrami assault group could<br />

not get close enough to <strong>the</strong>ir target to attack it directly, so <strong>the</strong>y shelled<br />

it instead.<br />

COMNIENTARY: <strong>The</strong> DRA and Soviets surrounded Kabul with a series<br />

<strong>of</strong> three security belts composed <strong>of</strong> outposts, minefields and obstacles.<br />

<strong>The</strong>ir purpose was to deny <strong>Mujahideen</strong> entry into <strong>the</strong> city and prevent<br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> shelling attacks. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> <strong>of</strong>ten attacked <strong>the</strong>se<br />

outposts, but could not hold <strong>the</strong>m. <strong>The</strong> main benefits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> security<br />

belt system to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> were <strong>the</strong>se attacks kept a large numbers<br />

<strong>of</strong> troops tied up in passive security roles, <strong>the</strong> outposts provided a<br />

source <strong>of</strong> weapons and ammunition and <strong>the</strong>se attacks affected <strong>the</strong><br />

morale <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir opponents.<br />

Commander Shahabuddin is from Shewaki Village south <strong>of</strong> Kabul. <strong>The</strong>re is no map with<br />

this vignette. [Map sheets 2885 and 2886].

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