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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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VIGNETTE 8<br />

RAID ON LATABAND SECURITY OUTPOSTS<br />

by Commander Wazir Gul<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are two highways between Kabul and Sarobi. <strong>The</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />

highway is <strong>the</strong> newer one and is part <strong>of</strong> Highway 1—<strong>the</strong> main highway<br />

<strong>of</strong> Afghanistan. <strong>The</strong> older Kabul-Sarobi highway runs roughly parallel<br />

to Highway 1, some four-ten kilometers to <strong>the</strong> south. A series <strong>of</strong><br />

Soviet and DRA security bases and outposts protected both highways.<br />

In September 1985, several <strong>Mujahideen</strong> groups combined to conduct a<br />

raid on <strong>the</strong> Soviet/DRA security outposts in <strong>the</strong> Lataband pass east <strong>of</strong><br />

Kabul (Map 2-7 - Lataband). Lataband is located on <strong>the</strong> old Kabul-<br />

Sarobi highway. <strong>The</strong> Lataband pass was protected by a Soviet base at<br />

Mulla Omar in <strong>the</strong> west, and a DRA Sarandoy base at Lataband in <strong>the</strong><br />

east. <strong>The</strong> area between <strong>the</strong> two bases was protected by several security<br />

outposts manned by DRA military detachments.<br />

My group's base was in Zandeh Kalay which is some 25 kilometers<br />

south <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pass. I planned <strong>the</strong> attack at <strong>the</strong> base. We left <strong>the</strong> base at<br />

1500 and moved to <strong>the</strong> Tezin Valley where we spent <strong>the</strong> night. We carried<br />

our supplies and ammunition on mules. Once we got to <strong>the</strong> Tezin<br />

Valley, I met with`<strong>the</strong> commanders <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r groups and we coordinated<br />

our attack. <strong>The</strong> total strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> combined <strong>Mujahideen</strong> force was<br />

about 150 fighters. We left what we did not need for immediate combat<br />

at Tezin and moved out toward our targets. We brought <strong>the</strong> mules<br />

with us. <strong>The</strong>re were three chief components in our combined force—<br />

two fire support groups and an assault group. Each fire support group<br />

had heavy weapons (three BM-1, four DShK, three 82mm mortars).<br />

<strong>The</strong>ir mission was to attack and pin down <strong>the</strong> Soviet base at Mulla<br />

Omar and <strong>the</strong> Sarandoy base at Lataband. <strong>The</strong> assault group had<br />

twelve RPG-7s and four 82mm recoilless rifles. <strong>The</strong> assault group was<br />

composed <strong>of</strong> three 20-man teams Each 20-man team had a designated<br />

enemy outpost to attack.<br />

We moved into position. In order to minimize <strong>the</strong> daylight available<br />

to <strong>the</strong> enemy's aircraft, we decided to start our attack in <strong>the</strong> late<br />

afternoon. We began <strong>the</strong> attack at 1600 with heavy fire on <strong>the</strong> bases<br />

at Mulla Omar and Lataband. Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong> assault teams occupy-<br />

Commander Wazir Gul was affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (JIA) <strong>of</strong> Burhanuddin<br />

Rabbani. His base was in Tezin southwest <strong>of</strong> Sarobi. He fought in <strong>the</strong> Sarobi, Lataband<br />

and Mahipar areas. [Map sheets 2985 and 2986vic grid 5618].

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