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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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VIGNETTE 1<br />

BATTLE OF BARAKI BARAK<br />

by Commander Qazi Guijan Tayeb<br />

Baraki Barak District is a very fertile oasis and a major green<br />

zone located between <strong>the</strong> two main highways running south and<br />

southwest from Kabul. One highway runs from Kabul to Gardez in<br />

Paktia Province and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r runs from Kabul to Gazhni and on to<br />

Kandahar. <strong>The</strong> waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Wardak River and Wardak Gorge irrigate<br />

this fertile area and wheat, corn, and rice fields intersperse with<br />

vineyards and orchards. This fertile, well-populated valley provided<br />

a natural base from which <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> could attack both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se<br />

main LOCS as well at Muhammad Agha District to <strong>the</strong> north and<br />

Gardez in <strong>the</strong> south.<br />

In June 1982 <strong>the</strong>re were several <strong>Mujahideen</strong> bases located in <strong>the</strong><br />

Baraki Barak District. We had brought a number <strong>of</strong> heavy antiaircraft<br />

machine guns into <strong>the</strong> area, particularly <strong>the</strong> ZGU-1 14 5mm<br />

single-barreled machine gun. <strong>The</strong> enemy was concerned about <strong>the</strong><br />

presence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se air defense weapons. We received information that<br />

<strong>the</strong> enemy was preparing an <strong>of</strong>fensive into our area with three major<br />

objectives: first, to seize our air defense weapons that were becoming<br />

a hindrance to <strong>the</strong>ir air raids in our . AO; second, to capture some <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> leading <strong>Mujahideen</strong> commanders who continuously harassed and<br />

attacked Soviet and DRA columns traveling on <strong>the</strong> two highways<br />

which bordered our area; and, third, to seize control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> area and<br />

restore <strong>the</strong> district government to <strong>the</strong> DRA. We had overthrown <strong>the</strong><br />

DRA district government in 1979.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Soviets and DRA launched <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>of</strong>fensive with more than<br />

20,000 troops involved directly and in support (Map 10-1 - Barak).<br />

<strong>The</strong>y sent out three columns, one each from Gardez, Kabul and<br />

Wardak. 1 <strong>The</strong>se forces moved to our area, established a cordon<br />

Commander Qazi Guijan Tayeb was a third year student in Kabul <strong>The</strong>ological College during<br />

<strong>the</strong> communist takeover in 1978. He joined Hikmatyar and later switched to <strong>the</strong> Sayef<br />

faction in <strong>the</strong> mid-1980s. He was <strong>the</strong> Commander <strong>of</strong> Baraki Barak District <strong>of</strong> Logar<br />

Province. [Map sheets 2784, 2785, 2884, 2885].<br />

1 Forces on <strong>the</strong> Gardez axis were from <strong>the</strong> Soviet 56th Air Assault Brigade and <strong>the</strong> DRA<br />

12th Infantry Division. Forces on <strong>the</strong> Kabul and Wardak axes were probably from <strong>the</strong><br />

Soviet 103rd Airborne Division and 108th Motorized Rifle Division, while DRA forces<br />

were probably from <strong>the</strong> 8th Infantry Division, 37th Commando Brigade and 15th Tank<br />

Brigade.

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