The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Page 330 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
casualties (33 KIA and 40 WIA). I think that enemy losses were
higher because we captured some 60 enemy small arms. 19
COMMENTARY: By drawing the bulk of the Mujahideen forces away
from their base and attacking the base from the rear, the Soviets
achieved a major surprise through deception and good planning. This
enabled them to overrun and destroy the Mujahideen bases without
facing any resistance. But Soviet failure to block the Mujahideen reinforcement
routes resulted in apparent heavy Soviet losses and forced
them to withdraw from the areas they had so easily captured.
Mujahideen rapid reinforcement changed the course of the battle.
Seizing and retaining the initiative is crucial to any tactical scheme.
The Mujahideen lost the initiative to the enemy at the beginning of the
battle. But, the Soviets failed to retain the initiative and lost it to the
Mujahideen maneuver of reserves from the rear. This decided the final
outcome of the battle. Guerrilla warfare is no different from conventional
warfare in that a reserve can drastically change the situation
through quick and effective commitment before the opponent consolidates
his tactical success.
19 Pakistani Strategic Studies Review, April 1986 notes: "Soviet forces launched air-cumground
attack on Mujahideen base in Krer area killed 26 Mujahideen destroyed their entire
armament and lost 42 men after 15 hours fighting March 26. Mujahideen killed 70 Kabul
and 50 Soviet troops and lost 42 men in their bid to break Soviet-Kabul encirclement of
Soran base in Krer area of Sarkani District March 28-31. Mujahideen repulsed Soviet
attack after hours of occupation of their base in Krer after inflicting heavy losses and
capturing three Soviet troops during 48 hours fighting March 30-31."