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The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

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VIGNETTE 11<br />

ZHAWAR Two<br />

by Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi Abdul-<br />

Rahman<br />

On 2 April 1986, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani was in <strong>the</strong> Zadran<br />

area when he saw approximately 20 transport helicopters flying over.<br />

He radioed <strong>the</strong> commanders at Zhawar and warned <strong>the</strong>m. He expected<br />

that <strong>the</strong> helicopters would land at Lezhi or Darakai. After his radio<br />

message, he saw ano<strong>the</strong>r group <strong>of</strong> helicopters, including some heavy<br />

transport helicopters, flying <strong>the</strong> same direction. <strong>The</strong>se were escorted<br />

by jet fighters. He again radioed this information to Zhawar. Zhawar<br />

had 700-800 <strong>Mujahideen</strong> combatants, plus air defense forces, at <strong>the</strong><br />

time. However Jalaluddin Haqani, <strong>the</strong> Zhawar Commander, was at<br />

Miram Shah. Mawlawi Haqani also radioed this information separately<br />

to Jalaluddin Haqani, who set out immediately for Zhawar.<br />

<strong>The</strong> usual Soviet/DRA pattern for an attack on a <strong>Mujahideen</strong> base<br />

was to pound <strong>the</strong> area heavily with air strikes and <strong>the</strong>n follow <strong>the</strong> air<br />

strikes with air assault landings, artillery fire and a ground advance<br />

to link up with <strong>the</strong> air assault forces. <strong>The</strong> air strike gave <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>Mujahideen</strong> commanders warning, reaction time and a solid indicator<br />

where <strong>the</strong> attack would go. In this case, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mujahideen</strong> were<br />

caught by surprise. <strong>The</strong>ir intelligence agents within <strong>the</strong> DRA failed<br />

to tip <strong>the</strong>m <strong>of</strong>f and <strong>the</strong> helicopters landed <strong>the</strong> DRA 38th Commando<br />

Brigade on seven dispersed landing zones around Zhawar. <strong>The</strong>re<br />

were 15 , helicopters in <strong>the</strong> first lift which landed at 0700 hours.<br />

More lifts followed to get <strong>the</strong> entire brigade on <strong>the</strong> ground. <strong>The</strong> first<br />

two helicopters landed on Spin Khwara plain. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> landing<br />

zones were within a kilometer <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pakistani border (Map 11-14 -<br />

Zhawar 2). Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> helicopters landed on <strong>the</strong> high ground to <strong>the</strong><br />

west <strong>of</strong> Zhawar. <strong>Mujahideen</strong> gunners destroyed two helicopters while<br />

<strong>the</strong>y were on <strong>the</strong> ground. Following <strong>the</strong> air assault, Soviet jet aircraft<br />

Lieutenant Omar contributed to <strong>the</strong> previous vignette.<br />

Mawlawi Nezamuddin Hagan' contributed to <strong>the</strong> previous vignette.<br />

Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman was a group commander from <strong>the</strong> Zadran tribe in Paktia Province.<br />

His bro<strong>the</strong>r was killed in this action. Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, <strong>The</strong> Bear Trap,<br />

London: Leo Cooper, 1992, 166-173 and ljaz S. Gilani and Fazal-Ru-Rahman, Afghanistan<br />

Report, Islamabad: <strong>The</strong> Institute <strong>of</strong> Strategic Studies, Number 25, April 1986, 2-5 also<br />

consulted for this vignette.

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