The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Chapter 11, Vignette 5 Page 295
artillery, not knowing that the Mujahideen had escaped. On the fifth
day, they entered the base, mined the caves, looted what they could
and left.
The Soviets then turned their attention to Kal-e Amani Canyon.
They came across the high ground from Kal-e Kaneske and air
assault troops attacked down into the canyon from the high ground.
Most of us were unable to escape and we lost some 50 Mujahideen
there. The Soviets then turned their attention to Shaykh Razi Baba
Canyon, but these Mujahideen had already left. This was the end of
the Mujahideen stronghold of Sharafat Koh. We now knew that we
could not hold these large bases in Afghanistan indefinitely against
the Soviets, so we moved our bases, staging areas and rest areas
across the border into Iran.
COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen maintained bases at Sharafat Koh
from 1979-1985. It was no secret that they were there and the
Soviets and DRA had ample opportunity to work against the base.
The Mujahideen were tied to these bases and had to maintain
sufficient defenders at Sharafat Koh at all times. This limited the
number of Mujahideen who could strike at the Soviets and DRA.
Once the Mujahideen split up into several canyons, they lacked
communications between the canyons and were unable to provide
warning or coordinate 'actions against the Soviets. The Soviets were
able to defeat each group piecemeal.
However, the Soviets were not successful in attacking Sharafat Koh
from the desert floor up. It took the Soviets a good deal of time before
they would land air assault forces on mountain tops far from link-up
forces. Once they started doing so, they were often successful.
However, some heliborne forces were isolated and destroyed in the
mountains by the Mujahideen. In this case, the Soviets were successful
when they used helicopters to land troops on the heights and attack
down to link up with ascending forces.