The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Chapter 4, Vignette 2 Page 125
The battle of Panjwayee is an example of how easily the resistance
could seize control of an isolated district center and how vulnerable the
resistance became once it was forced to defend the town in the face of
overwhelming Soviet/DRA forces. For this reason, it was only toward
the end of the Soviet occupation that the Mujahideen again moved to
seize control of major district and provincial centers. The source of the
resistance power was not the cities and towns but the rural areas and
the hundreds of the cross-border supply and infiltration routes which
they controlled throughout the war.
Tactically, a 25-man detachment accomplished what a 1,000 man
force could not. They did this through surprise and the indirect
approach. However, the lack of an overall operational command left
the Mujahideen vulnerable. After seizing Panjwayee, the Mujahideen
became overconfident and failed to prepare for the enemy
counter attack. They confidently parleyed with the militia while the
Soviet/DRA force formed and moved. The Mujahideen failed to
consolidate their victory and to establish defensive positions on the
hills to the east and west of Panjwayee and on the Arghandab River
to the north. They failed to post reconnaissance and ambush forces
on the likely enemy avenues of approach. Instead of having to fight
their way through a series of ambushes and then bumping into
outlying Mujahideen fortified positions, the Soviet/DRA relief force
moved unopposed to the battlefield and surprised the victorious
Mujahideen at Panjwayee.
Tactically, the Mujahideen realized that movement along streets is
suicidal in urban combat. However, the spontaneous nature of the
unpaid, volunteer Mujahideen made control very difficult. Mujahideen
forces joined the battle and left as they wished. Often, they did not
bother to let the coordinating commander know.