The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen ... - Tribal Analysis Center

Chapter 14, Vignette 13 Page 395
My gunner aimed, chanted and fired the RPG-7. The rocket flew,
but instead of hitting the second floor, it hit the fourth floor. A major
commotion ensued, but no one fired at us. We immediately left the
area and withdrew to our base. Later on, we were told that more than
20 people had been killed or wounded by our attack.
COMMENTARY: There are better sites for weapons instruction and qualification
than in the middle of a mission. In this case, the target was
large enough that it was difficult to miss. Still, the gunner was off by
two stories. Training to standard was a constant problem for
Mujahideen commanders. The best training was conducted in training
camps in Pakistan or in mountain bases. Unless urban guerrillas were
sent out for training, they had very little live-fire training other than
actual combat. Usually, urban guerrillas would detail a large security
party to hold the withdrawal route. In this case, the five-man team
relied on local contacts to watch the area rather than posting route
security.