JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
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Offensive Counterair Planning <strong>and</strong> Operations<br />
call missions are conducted against on-call targets, those emerging mobile targets <strong>and</strong> TSTs<br />
that require the execution of mutually supporting tasks (e.g., detection, acquisition, ID,<br />
tracking, attack, <strong>and</strong> assessment). These operations rely on sensor systems, a responsive<br />
NRT sensor management <strong>and</strong> communications network, <strong>and</strong> weapon systems capable of<br />
attacking targets as soon as adequate targeting information is available.<br />
(3) Target Acquisition. Acquisition <strong>and</strong> tracking systems may utilize cueing from<br />
wide-area <strong>and</strong> local surveillance systems <strong>and</strong> receive warning data from other intelligence<br />
sources. Acquisition supports target ID, discrimination, <strong>and</strong> timely engagement by<br />
accurately locating <strong>and</strong> monitoring targets <strong>and</strong> transmitting information relative to their<br />
movements.<br />
(a) Target Detection. In the case of BMs <strong>and</strong> CMs, detection can be<br />
accomplished through identifying launch signatures or intelligence sources such as<br />
measurement <strong>and</strong> signature intelligence or signals intelligence. To support attack operations<br />
in all environments, joint forces should minimize the effects of enemy countermeasures<br />
while capitalizing on distinctive equipment signatures. Surveillance capabilities should<br />
integrate national level intelligence with theater level capabilities. Space-, sea-, air-, <strong>and</strong><br />
ground-based area <strong>and</strong> point surveillance sensors also will be key to establishing a<br />
comprehensive surveillance network. Detection involves a systemic search of areas of<br />
interest identified during the IPB. After detection, warning or location data should be passed<br />
immediately to joint <strong>and</strong> component intelligence <strong>and</strong> operations centers, executing units, <strong>and</strong><br />
air <strong>and</strong> surface search equipment. Simultaneously, tactical warnings also should be provided<br />
to potential friendly targeted assets.<br />
(b) ID. ID of aircraft <strong>and</strong> missiles <strong>and</strong> their supporting nodes requires<br />
management of target movement data, determination of the type of system employed, <strong>and</strong><br />
discrimination of the launch <strong>and</strong> support systems from decoys. Target ID also requires the<br />
use of predictive intelligence, including the ID of potential future target locations, area<br />
limitation analysis, <strong>and</strong> automated cueing of sensors to threatening targets.<br />
(4) Attack. Observed enemy activity should trigger timely counterair execution.<br />
Targets identified in the IPB database are included in the JFC’s plan for preemptive strikes<br />
or operations at the onset of hostilities. Targets acquired are attacked in accordance with<br />
JFC guidance that normally allows attack of unanticipated/unplanned targets as they<br />
present themselves.<br />
(5) ATO. The ATO should be flexible enough to deal with immediate attack<br />
operations. The combat operations division of the JAOC is responsible for adjusting the<br />
ATO in order to deal with real-time developments in the operational area. One method to<br />
permit this flexibility is designating selected forces in the ATO as either ground alert or<br />
airborne alert. These on-call assets can then be tasked real time against immediate counterair<br />
targets.<br />
(6) TSTs. Prior planning, delegating authority, <strong>and</strong> having the appropriate C2<br />
systems can streamline decision cycles for attacking counterair TSTs.<br />
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