JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Chapter V
impact the theater-wide JDN. The JICO may recommend resolution of architectural and data
coordination issues between RICO/SICO cells.
For more detailed information on the JICO, see CJCSM 3115.01B, Joint Data Networks
(JDN) Operations.
Refer to FM 3-01.15/MCRP 3-25E/NTTP 3-01.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System, for a discussion of IADS.
5. Enemy Air and Missile Threats
a. Enemy threats comprise two main elements: air threats, including manned and UA
and CM, and BM.
(1) Air. Air threats can include bombers, fighter-attack, fighter escorts, ISR,
SEAD, EW, airlift (for airborne attacks), helicopters, CMs, ASMs, manned suicide bombers,
airborne early warning, UA, and AR aircraft. It should be noted that UA are being
developed with more technologically advanced systems and capabilities. They can duplicate
some of the capabilities of manned aircraft for both surveillance/reconnaissance and attack
missions. They can be small enough and/or slow enough to elude detection by standard early
warning sensor systems and could pose a formidable threat to friendly forces.
(2) BMs. BMs pose a significant challenge since they are often difficult to detect
and destroy after launch. They can be employed from long ranges across AOR boundaries
and in all types of weather. BMs, whether employed in high or low altitude trajectories, also
present unique problems, including high velocities and short reaction times for the defender.
BMs include short, medium, intermediate, and long range/intercontinental and have
trajectories that are commonly divided into four phases of flight: boost, ascent, midcourse,
and terminal.
Additional information is provided in Appendix D, “Threat Missile Systems,” and Appendix
E, “Global Ballistic Missile Defense Synchronization.”
b. C2 facilities, like other infrastructure targets (e.g., ammunition storage), are vital
links in the enemy’s system that enable them to generate combat power and attack through
the air domain.
c. Air and missile threats vary in technological sophistication and capabilities;
additionally, technology transfers and weapons proliferation complicate the ability to assess
all potential threats with certainty. Many countries possess and continually upgrade modern
combat aircraft, but an air force and its sustainment can be very expensive in comparison to a
missile force. Based on improved technologies and increases in the number of available
missile systems, the number of countries with both short- and long-range missile capabilities
is likely to increase. Also, a mobile missile force can be dispersed to complicate its being
targeted and employed from remote sites without the infrastructure, support, and manpower
required for aircraft. The proliferation of CMs, BMs, and UASs complicates the tasks of
providing force protection and attaining air superiority.
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