JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

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Threat Missile Systems targeting mobile GLCM platforms or newly built fixed launch sites will depend on a robust IPB, dynamic management of ISR assets, dedicated and trained analysts aided by technology improvements such as automatic target recognition systems, and a responsive C2 architecture. 5. Air-to-Surface Missiles ASMs employment can be expected on all battlefields. Like BMs and CMs, ASMs are capable of delivering a complete range of warheads and can be carried by a variety of rotaryand fixed-wing platforms. Flight profiles, short flight times, and reduced radar cross-section make these missiles difficult to detect, track, and engage. Additionally, their speed and relatively short flight times leave a small window for interception. ASMs increase the survivability of the delivery platform through standoff capability, usually beyond the range of some point defenses. Many of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and former Warsaw Pact nations are equipped with US and Russian manufactured systems and have exported them throughout the world. The best method for countering ASMs is to target the delivery platforms and related bases and facilities. 6. Conclusion While each missile system is unique, each category (BM, CM, and ASM) exhibits similar characteristics and functional operations. This appendix provides the essential THE LURE OF THE UNEXPECTED Deception is a key part of any combat operations. The examples below illustrate what happens when analysts stop analyzing events and begin to believe what they think they are seeing. World War II Prior to the beginning of the V-1 attacks against London on June 12, 1944, the Allied attack operations concentrated on an elaborate system of “sites” which were believed to be Nazi V-1 launch locations. The locations were dubbed “ski sites” because of the shape of several long, curved buildings that were characteristic in the aerial photographs of each location. These sites were targeted and heavily bombed from December 1943 through May 1944. Although the “ski sites” were largely destroyed, not one of the real V-1 sites was attacked during this period. Once Hitler unleashed his missile force on England in June, the volume of V-1 launches provided incontrovertible evidence that a second set of launch sites was actually being used. Not until then did the weight of the Allied bombing effort finally begin to shift to the correct targets. Even so, the real sites were so hard to find due to Nazi camouflage and concealment measures that attacks were still being made on nearby decoy “ski sites” until the end of June. SOURCE: Based on Operation CROSSBOW Volume of the US Strategic Bombing Survey D-9
Appendix D Gulf War The initial hope of the planners in Riyadh that heavy attacks on the fixed Scud sites during the opening hours of the air campaign would largely eliminate Iraq’s capability to launch tactical ballistic missiles against Israel or regional members of the US-led Coalition proved to be illusory. On the night of 16-17 January 1991, the fixed Scud launchers in western Iraq functioned as “decoys” that diverted attention away from the mobile launchers that had already deployed to their wartime “hide” sites, and the first of Iraq’s extended-range Scuds were fired at Israel the following night. Once Scuds started falling, first on Israel and then on Saudi Arabia two days later, the next best military option would have been to locate and attack mobile launchers before they had time to fire. Soviet exercise patterns in central Europe with Scud-B’s and Iraqi practice during the Iran-Iraq War, indicated that if the Iraqis followed prior practices, there might be enough pre-launch signatures and time to give patrolling aircraft some chance of attacking mobile launchers before they fired. However, the Iraqis dramatically cut their pre-launch set-up times, avoided any prelaunch electromagnetic emissions that might give away their locations before launch, and seeded the launch areas with decoys (some of which were very high in fidelity)…most (and possibly all) of the roughly 100 mobile launchers reported destroyed by Coalition aircraft and special operation forces now appear to have been either decoys, other vehicles such as tanker trucks, or other objects unfortunate enough to provide “Scud-like” signatures. SOURCE: Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1993 framework for each in a generic fashion and serves as a foundation for an initial understanding of how missiles are employed. Specific analysis is required to apply this information to a particular missile system and country. The following vignette is a reminder that some “facts” should be verified, not simply accepted. D-10 JP 3-01
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Joint Publication 3-01 Countering A
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Preface Intentionally Blank ii JP 3
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Summary of Changes Intentionally Bl
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Table of Contents Section A. Intell
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Table of Contents III-2 Formation A
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Executive Summary defend itself. Sy
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Executive Summary • Designate an
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Executive Summary Cross Area of Res
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Executive Summary the JFC, are the
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Executive Summary of separate MNF C
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Executive Summary Defensive Counter
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Executive Summary air-, and sea bas
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Chapter I (1) Air Superiority. Air
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Chapter I (b) Suppression of Enemy
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Chapter I (2) Establishing and moni
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Chapter I and surrounding territori
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Chapter I Intentionally Blank I-10
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Chapter II TACON while surface-base
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Chapter II (6) Establish, coordinat
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Chapter II some of the functions of
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Chapter II and air operations with
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Chapter II integration, and deconfl
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Chapter II (11) Make OCA attack ope
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Chapter II atmospheric) BM engageme
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Chapter II authority down to a RADC
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Chapter II Factors Affecting the Mi
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Chapter II including considerations
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Chapter II unit commander/JFLCC on
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Chapter II (6) Joint Interface Cont
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Chapter II all echelons to achieve
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Chapter II JFACC/AADC and authorize
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Chapter III making process, the JIP
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Chapter III Details regarding the J
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Chapter III Principles for Planning
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Chapter III (6) Procedures to exped
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Chapter III c. During forcible entr
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Chapter III minimizing duplication
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Chapter III scenarios, but generall
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Chapter III 13. Identification, Com
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Chapter III enemy (i.e., low confid
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Chapter III 17. Critical Asset List
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Chapter III (a) Level 1. Level 1 pr
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Chapter III and take advantage of r
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Chapter III commercial, and request
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Chapter III Intentionally Blank III
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Chapter IV threads that tie all joi
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Chapter IV (7) Assessment—the abi
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Chapter IV special operations, and
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Chapter IV SECTION B. OFFENSIVE COU
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Chapter IV (5) Major IADS C2 facili
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Chapter IV Refer to JP 3-60, Joint
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Chapter IV protect specific operati
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Chapter IV (2) An air support reque
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Chapter IV 10. Fighter Sweep a. The
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Chapter IV Intentionally Blank IV-2
Page 111 and 112: Chapter V (1) Centralized Planning
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Page 119 and 120: Chapter V (2) DCA Estimate. Planner
Page 121 and 122: Chapter V (b) Point Defense. Point
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Page 127 and 128: Chapter V (5) Firing Doctrine. Guid
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Page 131 and 132: Chapter V (d) Chemical, Biological,
Page 133 and 134: Chapter V annihilation, AD aircraft
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Page 139 and 140: Appendix A e. Electronic methods pr
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Page 145 and 146: Appendix B (3) Describe BM defense
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Page 149 and 150: Appendix B Enclosure 1: References
Page 151 and 152: Appendix C terrain and air avenues
Page 153 and 154: Appendix C (5) Passive and active D
Page 155 and 156: Appendix D b. Manufacturing. Countr
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Page 159 and 160: Appendix D 4. Cruise Missiles a. A
Page 161: Appendix D infrastructure, logistic
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Page 167 and 168: Appendix E supporting commander, ba
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Page 177 and 178: Appendix F m. JP 3-27, Homeland Def
Page 179 and 180: Appendix G 6. Distribution of Elect
Page 181 and 182: Glossary C2 CAL CAP CAS CBRN CCDR C
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Page 191 and 192: Glossary flight advisory. None. (Ap
Page 193 and 194: Glossary employed to engage air thr
Page 195 and 196: Glossary radar netting unit. None.
Page 197 and 198: Glossary been identified. (Approved
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