JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
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Appendix E<br />
delegated to the lowest practical level consistent with the ROE, the DAL, the AADP, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
authority of the JFC. The process <strong>and</strong> means of ordering engagements will be clearly stated<br />
in AADPs, ACOs, <strong>and</strong> SPINS, or other orders. Engagement coordination requires the ability<br />
to plan GBMD resources to optimize the operational environment <strong>and</strong> decision timelines;<br />
identify <strong>and</strong> track multiple, simultaneous missile threats; <strong>and</strong> direct engagement against<br />
multiple BM threats. To optimize decentralized execution of BMD engagement<br />
opportunities, it is essential to have clear policy guidance, shared situational awareness,<br />
minimal system latency, <strong>and</strong> the capability to synchronize efforts across AORs. The one<br />
exception to decentralized execution of BMD is for homel<strong>and</strong> BMD, using the ground based<br />
mid-course defense system, which requires positive direction from the weapons release<br />
authority (WRA). WRA is the authority delegated from the President to use certain weapons<br />
against BM threats (e.g., ground-based interceptors).<br />
(5) Support Relationships. Directives that establish a support relationship for<br />
GBMD must include the forces <strong>and</strong> resources allocated to the supporting effort; the time,<br />
place, level, <strong>and</strong> duration of the supporting effort; the relative priority of the supporting<br />
effort; the authority, if any, of the supporting comm<strong>and</strong>er to modify the supporting effort in<br />
the event of an exceptional opportunity or an emergency; <strong>and</strong> the degree of authority granted<br />
to the supported comm<strong>and</strong>er over the supporting effort. Unless limited by the establishing<br />
directive, the supported comm<strong>and</strong>er will have the authority to exercise general direction of<br />
the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation <strong>and</strong> prioritization of targets<br />
or objectives, timing <strong>and</strong> duration of the supporting action, <strong>and</strong> other instructions necessary<br />
for coordination <strong>and</strong> efficiency. The supporting comm<strong>and</strong>er determines the forces, tactics,<br />
methods, procedures, <strong>and</strong> communications to be employed in providing this support. The<br />
supporting comm<strong>and</strong>er will advise <strong>and</strong> coordinate with the supported comm<strong>and</strong>er on matters<br />
concerning the employment <strong>and</strong> limitations of such support, assist in planning for the<br />
integration of such support into the supported comm<strong>and</strong>er’s effort as a whole, <strong>and</strong> ensure<br />
that support requirements are appropriately communicated with the supporting comm<strong>and</strong>er’s<br />
organization. The supporting comm<strong>and</strong>er has the responsibility to ascertain the BMD needs<br />
of the supported comm<strong>and</strong>er <strong>and</strong> take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities,<br />
consistent with priorities <strong>and</strong> requirements of other assigned tasks.<br />
(6) Offensive Operations. The GCC in whose AOR the threat resides is responsible<br />
to plan offensive options that support homel<strong>and</strong> BMD <strong>and</strong> cross-AOR BMD. Because of the<br />
relative scarcity of defensive assets when compared to the threat, GCCs <strong>and</strong> functional<br />
CCDRs should have well-developed plans <strong>and</strong> agreements with appropriate operating<br />
procedures in place for suitable offensive actions to counter BM threats. If offensive<br />
operations are directed by the President, other GCCs may be tasked to support a neighboring<br />
GCC by conducting offensive strikes against imminent missile threats (pre-launch) or BMD<br />
support after the launch <strong>and</strong> identification of a BM as hostile. CDRUSSTRATCOM may<br />
provide global strike in coordination with a supported/supporting GCC, as directed by the<br />
President. BMD planners should coordinate their efforts with combating WMD planners to<br />
optimize use of offensive actions/operations.<br />
For additional information regarding combating WMD, see <strong>JP</strong> 3-40, Combating Weapons of<br />
Mass Destruction.<br />
E-6 <strong>JP</strong> 3-<strong>01</strong>