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JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

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Introduction<br />

<strong>and</strong> thereby minimizing the potential effects of adversary reconnaissance, surveillance, <strong>and</strong><br />

attack. Passive AMD measures are considered the same for air <strong>and</strong> BM threats, with one<br />

exception: detection <strong>and</strong> warning of BM attack is normally provided by supporting<br />

assets from outside the theater/joint operations area (JOA) in concert with deployed<br />

AMD C2 systems <strong>and</strong> sensors.<br />

Further discussion of DCA can be found in Chapter V, “Defensive Counterair Planning <strong>and</strong><br />

Operations.”<br />

3. <strong>Countering</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Missile</strong> Threat Integration <strong>and</strong> Synchronization<br />

a. Although OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA are considered separate operations, they must facilitate<br />

unity of effort through integration <strong>and</strong> synchronization. Many of the same forces may be<br />

required for both OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA operations; therefore, early, continuous, <strong>and</strong> close<br />

coordination is required. Integrating a mixture of capabilities from components bolsters the<br />

friendly force potential <strong>and</strong> likely will frustrate the enemy’s ability to defend itself.<br />

Synchronization of OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA operations is vital to avoid duplication of effort <strong>and</strong> help<br />

prevent fratricide.<br />

b. <strong>Countering</strong> air <strong>and</strong> missile threat operations requires integration <strong>and</strong> synchronization<br />

including the actions within <strong>and</strong> across the following areas:<br />

(1) Integration of OCA elements capable of contributing to attack operations.<br />

(2) Integration of DCA elements includes the integration of active <strong>and</strong> passive<br />

AMD capabilities <strong>and</strong> measures.<br />

(3) Integration of OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA.<br />

(4) Focuses on coordination between GCCs.<br />

(5) Balancing the BMD needs at the combatant comm<strong>and</strong>er (CCDR) level with the<br />

broader global BMD needs, which include HD. GBMD focuses on a collaborative planning<br />

process among CCDRs orchestrated/led by a designated comm<strong>and</strong>er with coordinating<br />

authority.<br />

(6) Participation with <strong>and</strong> defending our allies is a critical part of IAMD. For this<br />

reason, capabilities of US forces <strong>and</strong> allies must be integrated <strong>and</strong> leveraged to achieve<br />

maximum warfighting potential during all phases of the conflict.<br />

c. Considerations for integrating <strong>and</strong> synchronizing OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA include:<br />

(1) Using a single comm<strong>and</strong>er with an adequate C2 system to be responsible for<br />

both OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA operations. Typically, this is the joint force air component comm<strong>and</strong>er<br />

(JFACC), who normally is also the area air defense comm<strong>and</strong>er (AADC) <strong>and</strong> the airspace<br />

control authority (ACA).<br />

I-5

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