JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
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Introduction<br />
<strong>and</strong> thereby minimizing the potential effects of adversary reconnaissance, surveillance, <strong>and</strong><br />
attack. Passive AMD measures are considered the same for air <strong>and</strong> BM threats, with one<br />
exception: detection <strong>and</strong> warning of BM attack is normally provided by supporting<br />
assets from outside the theater/joint operations area (JOA) in concert with deployed<br />
AMD C2 systems <strong>and</strong> sensors.<br />
Further discussion of DCA can be found in Chapter V, “Defensive Counterair Planning <strong>and</strong><br />
Operations.”<br />
3. <strong>Countering</strong> <strong>Air</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Missile</strong> Threat Integration <strong>and</strong> Synchronization<br />
a. Although OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA are considered separate operations, they must facilitate<br />
unity of effort through integration <strong>and</strong> synchronization. Many of the same forces may be<br />
required for both OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA operations; therefore, early, continuous, <strong>and</strong> close<br />
coordination is required. Integrating a mixture of capabilities from components bolsters the<br />
friendly force potential <strong>and</strong> likely will frustrate the enemy’s ability to defend itself.<br />
Synchronization of OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA operations is vital to avoid duplication of effort <strong>and</strong> help<br />
prevent fratricide.<br />
b. <strong>Countering</strong> air <strong>and</strong> missile threat operations requires integration <strong>and</strong> synchronization<br />
including the actions within <strong>and</strong> across the following areas:<br />
(1) Integration of OCA elements capable of contributing to attack operations.<br />
(2) Integration of DCA elements includes the integration of active <strong>and</strong> passive<br />
AMD capabilities <strong>and</strong> measures.<br />
(3) Integration of OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA.<br />
(4) Focuses on coordination between GCCs.<br />
(5) Balancing the BMD needs at the combatant comm<strong>and</strong>er (CCDR) level with the<br />
broader global BMD needs, which include HD. GBMD focuses on a collaborative planning<br />
process among CCDRs orchestrated/led by a designated comm<strong>and</strong>er with coordinating<br />
authority.<br />
(6) Participation with <strong>and</strong> defending our allies is a critical part of IAMD. For this<br />
reason, capabilities of US forces <strong>and</strong> allies must be integrated <strong>and</strong> leveraged to achieve<br />
maximum warfighting potential during all phases of the conflict.<br />
c. Considerations for integrating <strong>and</strong> synchronizing OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA include:<br />
(1) Using a single comm<strong>and</strong>er with an adequate C2 system to be responsible for<br />
both OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA operations. Typically, this is the joint force air component comm<strong>and</strong>er<br />
(JFACC), who normally is also the area air defense comm<strong>and</strong>er (AADC) <strong>and</strong> the airspace<br />
control authority (ACA).<br />
I-5