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JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

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Combat Identification<br />

a. ID Matrix Use Versus Implementation of TDL Track ID/Classification. Track<br />

ID/classification data shared over a TDL may not support the CID process. Planners must<br />

consider how the IDs are determined <strong>and</strong> entered into the track ID/classification system (e.g.,<br />

a TDL) that portrays a particular track throughout the C2 systems. The JICO cell planners<br />

should provide a list of ID classifications (e.g., unknown, friendly, hostile, neutral) to be<br />

used on the TDL.<br />

(1) The ID matrix must take into consideration the limitations inherent in the<br />

employed systems that will implement the ID procedures. Once the set of track symbols is<br />

determined, the use of terminology for these symbols must be aligned. Each JFC should<br />

have ID criteria that include brevity code terms. For example, pay particular attention to the<br />

“b<strong>and</strong>it” codeword versus the system track symbol for “hostile.” An enemy aircraft with a<br />

TDL tracking symbol for hostile could be called a “b<strong>and</strong>it” (ID as enemy not authorized to<br />

engage) or called a “hostile” (ID as enemy with authority to engage). The AADC should<br />

ensure only those specific voice brevity terms approved by the JFC for authority to engage<br />

are used throughout the CID process.<br />

(2) Build the ID matrix to the lowest common denominator, that is, what everyone<br />

can classify/transmit/receive/forward to support the shooter. This will reduce the risk of<br />

missed targets <strong>and</strong> fratricide.<br />

b. ID Criteria. ID criteria are used for application of ROE. The ROE supports CID<br />

criteria for an engagement decision dependent upon weapon systems capabilities. The<br />

AADC is responsible for recommending DCA ROE <strong>and</strong> developing ID <strong>and</strong> engagement<br />

criteria for JFC approval in the AADP, with specific instructions in the ATO <strong>and</strong>/or SPINS.<br />

c. Positive ID Methods<br />

(1) IFF Modes (1-5 per the ATO/SPINS).<br />

(2) PPLI.<br />

(3) A radar contact correlated with an authenticated/secure voice (position) report<br />

from an air or ground control agency.<br />

(4) External/onboard CID systems (e.g., blue force tracker or noncooperative target<br />

recognition).<br />

(5) Visual ID.<br />

d. Positive ID Considerations<br />

(1) Positive ID is an ID derived from visual observation <strong>and</strong>/or electronic systems,<br />

possibly combined with other factors (e.g., point of origin), with a higher confidence of<br />

accuracy than a simple lack of friend or lack of enemy. Positive ID criteria, as established by<br />

the comm<strong>and</strong>er’s ROE, are a basis for CID for engagement (shoot/no-shoot) decisions, so it<br />

is useable for ID for airspace control <strong>and</strong> AD tracking. When available, positive ID is used<br />

because it provides the most rapid, reliable, <strong>and</strong> transferable means of ID. Most enemy<br />

A-3

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