JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Chapter III
17. Critical Asset List Development
a. All assets nominated for the CAL usually are prioritized based on a methodology of
assessing the three major factors of criticality, vulnerability (includes recoverability), and the
threat (CVT). This is called the “CVT methodology.” The CVT process is objective and
considers intelligence, air operations, ground combat operations, maritime operations, and
support operations. Each asset is evaluated against defined criteria, and these criteria are
weighed based on the consideration of the JFC’s intent, CONOPS, and COG concerns.
b. CAL Development Factors
(1) Criticality is the degree to which an asset is essential to accomplishing the
mission. It is determined by assessing the impact that damage to or destruction of the asset
will have on the success of the operation/campaign. Damage to an asset may prevent,
significantly delay, or have no impact on success of the plan.
(2) Vulnerability consists of two parts: susceptibility (the degree an asset is
susceptible to surveillance, attack, or damage), and recoverability, if attacked and damaged.
Recoverability, once a factor itself, is now a subset of vulnerability and is the degree and
ability to recover/reconstitute from inflicted damage in terms of time, equipment, and
manpower and to continue the mission. Commanders should consider the time to replace
personnel, equipment, or entire units, as well as whether other forces can perform the same
mission. The following factors should be considered when assessing vulnerability:
(a) Survivability and cover (hardening).
(b) Camouflage, concealment, and deception.
(c) Mobility and dispersion.
(d) Ability to adequately defend itself from air/missile threats.
(3) Threat. Assess the probability an asset will be targeted for surveillance or
attack by a credible/capable adversary. Determination of adversary intent and capability are
key determinants of assessing the probability of attack. A thorough JIPOE oriented
specifically on adversary air and missile capabilities is key to an accurate threat assessment.
Examples include targeting information provided by intelligence estimates, past adversary
surveillance and attack methods, and threat doctrine.
c. High Value Assets (HVAs). HVAs are classified as friendly critical assets requiring
protection. They may be any forces, facilities, or area, etc., the friendly commander requires
for the successful completion of the mission. They are categorized as follows:
(1) High Value Geopolitical Assets. Those assets so important that the loss of
even one could seriously impact the JFC’s operation/campaign. In addition, the political
ramifications of destroying one of these assets could provide the adversary with a
tremendous propaganda victory.
III-20 JP 3-01