JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Chapter III
scenarios, but generally not for engagement decisions for which positive ID is normally
required because of the risk of fratricide. The AADP should include a matrix with criteria
developed by the AADC in coordination with the components and approved by the JFC
that can be used to establish a track ID for a detected object. The ID matrix is a logic
tree for categorizing a track (e.g., friendly, hostile, unknown, or neutral) and following it
throughout its life in the AOR/JOA. The ID matrix applies logical steps to ID a track using
all available means in the operational area. By following the criteria in the matrix, users
assess the identity of an unknown for tracking and additional action, if necessary. If not
identified as friendly, an object being tracked may require further assessment based on
position, the ROE, and weapons control status (WCS). WCS will be discussed in Chapter V,
“Defensive Counterair Planning and Operations,” paragraph 11, “Active Air and Missile
Defense.”
d. Auto-ID Systems. Some weapon systems have the capability to execute an auto-ID
function (e.g., aircraft carrier auto-ID, Aegis-equipped ships, and PATRIOT missile
systems). Use of auto-ID can reduce the workload (no man in the loop) and improve the
timeliness of the ID process in an extremely dynamic/saturated AD environment, but it also
can result in mistaken ID and fratricide, engagement of noncombatants, or inadvertent
protection for the enemy. The CID and ROE criteria for engagement should explicitly
discuss when and what types of auto-ID are allowed. Automation should enhance, and not
replace, the judgment of operators in a tactical situation and should be used only to keep the
operators from being so overwhelmed they become ineffective and cannot make enough
knowledgeable decisions.
e. Formation assessment, applicable to both friendly and hostile formations, is a
procedural ID method used to apply the ID (from positive or procedural means) of one air
track to other aircraft operating in mutual support as determined by their spatial relationship.
That spatial relationship (horizontal range, altitude separation, speed, and course), called
formation criteria, must be determined by the AADC and ACA, approved by the JFC, and
published in the AADP and ACP. Formation criteria may vary by theater/JOA. See Figure
III-2 for a depiction of that spatial relationship. These formation criteria are a procedural
ACM to help manage the volume of tracks (and operator workload) that must be displayed
on the joint TDL and elsewhere (e.g., COP). Formation strength information may be
handled in various ways by those surveillance elements of the IADS that contribute to the
MTN. To declutter the air tracking displays of surveillance systems, a single track is carried
with the number of objects meeting the formation criteria entered as a number on the track
information associated with the ID symbol. Referred to by various systems as strength/flight
size/raid numbers/composition, the process is described as formation tracking. The purpose
of formation assessment is to provide timely and accurate track ID to engagement platforms
(airborne or surface-based AD assets) to support engagement decisions for hostiles yet
minimize the chances of fratricide. The use of formation assessment presumes that a
formation track has been established and that an ID has been placed upon the formation track
by competent ID authority. Also, the same formation assessment criteria must be applied to
the other local tracks (non-TDL tracks) as was used by the surveillance system used to create
the formation track to ensure integrity of the process. Failure to use the same specified
criteria for formation tracking and formation assessment may mistakenly result in the
application of “friend protection” to hostile aircraft or engagement of friendly aircraft by
III-14 JP 3-01