JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
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Chapter V<br />
annihilation, AD aircraft should be used to counter the enemy aircraft that normally carry<br />
CMs <strong>and</strong> ASMs before they are in threatening range.<br />
d. Execution of DCA operations requires continuous surveillance of the theater/JOA.<br />
Integration <strong>and</strong> connectivity of sensors should provide a complete, reliable, <strong>and</strong> timely CTP<br />
for decision making. The track production (including ID) follows a sequential process with<br />
dissemination of track data as rapidly as possible. That detailed track data permits C2 nodes<br />
to evaluate tracks <strong>and</strong> determine their significance. Tactical warnings trigger some passive<br />
AD measures <strong>and</strong> cue active AD assets for action. Active AD forces then engage hostile<br />
tracks or allow passage of friendly tracks. Through effective battle management the<br />
positively identified threats are engaged by the optimum system available.<br />
e. The AADC controls the battle using approved authorities (e.g., ID, commitment, <strong>and</strong><br />
engagement) <strong>and</strong> the flexibility of the IADS. To decentralize execution, the AADC<br />
normally will delegate some or all AADC authorities down to the RADC/SADC level (if<br />
established). The AADC must specify the conditions <strong>and</strong> limits within which engagement<br />
authority is decentralized. Based upon the threat level <strong>and</strong> the complexity of<br />
engagements, a control node should retain engagement authority if it can adequately<br />
perform battle management. For air battle management, the AADC or a RADC/SADC<br />
uses three tools for which the authorities may be delegated further down to the tactical level:<br />
ADW, WCS, <strong>and</strong> fire control orders.<br />
(1) <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> Warning Conditions (ADWCs). An AD warning, which<br />
includes missile attacks, is issued as an ADWC. The ADWC is a degree of air attack<br />
probability based on the threat assessment. The AADC establishes the baseline ADWCs for<br />
the joint force. ADWCs may be different for air-breathing threats than for BMs.<br />
Subordinate ADCs may issue higher but not lower ADWCs for their areas. ADWCs are<br />
disseminated though joint <strong>and</strong> components C2 channels to all AMD elements <strong>and</strong> fire units.<br />
(a) ADWC White—An attack by hostile aircraft or missile is improbable.<br />
(b) ADWC Yellow—An attack by hostile aircraft or missile is probable.<br />
progress.<br />
(c) ADWC Red—An attack by hostile aircraft or missile is imminent or in<br />
(2) WCS. WCS is a control measure designed to establish the freedom for fighters<br />
<strong>and</strong> surface AD weapons (including small arms weapons) to engage threats. The AADC<br />
establishes WCS for the joint force. The WCS may be different for air-breathing threats<br />
than for BMs. WCS authority originates with the AADC <strong>and</strong> can be delegated to<br />
subordinate comm<strong>and</strong>ers. Different WCSs may be applied simultaneously to different<br />
weapons systems <strong>and</strong> in different airspace areas. US forces use three st<strong>and</strong>ard WCSs that<br />
may be declared for a particular area <strong>and</strong> time. US forces do not disseminate these WCS<br />
orders via TDL. The WCSs are “free, tight, <strong>and</strong> hold.”<br />
(a) Weapons Free—The least restrictive status; when any target not positively<br />
identified as friendly in accordance with current ROE may be engaged. Weapons free zones<br />
V-24 <strong>JP</strong> 3-<strong>01</strong>