JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
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Executive Summary<br />
air-, <strong>and</strong> sea based forces/capabilities for those DCA<br />
operations required to execute that plan.<br />
Passive <strong>Air</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Missile</strong><br />
<strong>Defense</strong> (AMD)<br />
Comm<strong>and</strong>ers at all levels<br />
are responsible for<br />
planning <strong>and</strong> executing<br />
appropriate passive AMD<br />
measures.<br />
Active AMD<br />
Passive AMD provides individual <strong>and</strong> collective protection<br />
for friendly forces <strong>and</strong> critical assets <strong>and</strong> is the<br />
responsibility of every comm<strong>and</strong>er in the joint force. It<br />
includes measures, other than active AMD, taken to<br />
minimize, mitigate, or recover from the consequences of<br />
attack aircraft <strong>and</strong> missiles. Passive measures do not<br />
involve the employment of weapons, but they do improve<br />
survivability.<br />
Under the counterair framework, active missile defense is<br />
integrated with active air defense as a DCA operation.<br />
Generally, the same capabilities used for missile defense<br />
are capable of air defense. The important factors are the<br />
enemy missile threat <strong>and</strong> the conservation of missile<br />
defense assets to prevent that unique capability from<br />
being exhausted against aircraft when an alternative air<br />
defense strategy <strong>and</strong> tactics could be used against airbreathing<br />
threats. Active BMD involves direct defensive<br />
action taken to destroy in flight BM threats. Active missile<br />
defense systems are primarily SAM systems <strong>and</strong> their<br />
supporting infrastructure. Although BM launches are<br />
detected <strong>and</strong> warnings are sent to the JFC with the<br />
predicted impact point, engagements are only possible once<br />
organic missile defense radars detect them.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
This publication provides doctrine for joint counterair<br />
operations <strong>and</strong> protection against air <strong>and</strong> missile threats<br />
across the range of military operations.<br />
xxii <strong>JP</strong> 3-<strong>01</strong>