JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Chapter IV
(2) An air support request (ASR) should identify known or suspected enemy air
defense threats to, from, and around the target area. Within their capabilities, each echelon
handling the request refines and updates threat data. The ASR contains this updated data,
along with the type of suppression desired by the requesting component. For example,
during the planning and execution of CAS, TACPs and other fire support agencies identify
potential local SEAD targets and request SEAD fire support.
Refer to FM 3-01.4/MCRP 3-22.2A/NTTP 3-01.42/AFTTP(I) 3-2.28, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, for additional detailed
information regarding SEAD.
9. Fighter Escort
a. Fighter escort missions are often essential to offensive air operations and for
protection of HVAAs. As an OCA mission, fighter escort sorties are normally flown over
SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES IN “THE STORM”
On the morning of 17 January [1991], an EA-6B from Marine Tactical
Electronic Warfare Squadron Two provided electronic warfare support for
Marine, Navy, and Royal Air Force strike packages attacking strategic
targets at the Al-‘Amarah and Az-Zubayr command and control sites, as
well as the Az-Zubayr railroad yards and the Al-Basrah bridges across the
Tigris River. These targets were heavily defended by interlocking belts of
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA). Iraqi
fighters also were a potential threat. This was a dangerous mission—
among the first daylight strikes of the war. Long before they approached
the targets, the EA-6B crew started to work. The first enemy radar that
came up was quickly jammed. Shortly after, however, additional radars
were noted searching for the strike groups. Jamming of Iraqi long-range
early warning radars allowed the strikers to approach undetected.
However, Iraqi ground control intercept radars as well as target tracking
radars simultaneously began probing the Coalition strike package. The
EA-6B crew quickly introduced intense electronic jamming into all modes
of the Iraqi air defense system, which prevented the vectoring of enemy
fighters. They also forced SAM and AAA systems into autonomous
operation, uncoordinated by the command and control system which
greatly reduced their ability to locate and track Coalition aircraft. To
accomplish this, the EA-6B crew did not attempt evasive action but placed
themselves into a predictable, wings-level orbit which highlighted their
position amidst the beaconing (sic) and jamming strobes of the enemy
radars. The severe degradation to radio transmissions caused by
jamming interference limited the EA-6B’s ability to receive threat calls,
making it vulnerable to enemy aircraft. Nonetheless, the crew remained
on station, enabling all Coalition aircraft to strike the targets, accomplish
the missions, and return home without loss or damage.
SOURCE: 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing Award Citation
cited in DOD Final Report to Congress,
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992
IV-16 JP 3-01