JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Chapter I
(2) Establishing and monitoring an interoperable and robust C2 system from the
JFC/JFACC through the component commanders and down to the tactical units to facilitate
the centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution normally required for
counterair. The C2 system should be able to seamlessly flow information and warnings and
to control assets from one mission/task to another, based on the daily requirements to support
the JFC’s operation/campaign. Communications architecture is a critical element for
counterair due to the time-sensitivity of some targets. The C2 system must connect sensors
to intelligence nodes and decision makers and to operators throughout the operational area.
(3) Ensuring commanders integrate counterair capabilities and optimize the balance
between OCA and DCA strengths and vulnerabilities. For example, destruction of BMs
prior to their launch provides greater force protection than engaging them in flight. These
prelaunch attacks must be planned and synchronized with the overall DCA scheme to
maximize the effectiveness of resources.
d. If the adversary is successful in launching BMs against US and multinational forces
(MNFs), the joint force relies on the defensive coverage provided by US Navy Aegis cruisers
and destroyers and US Army AD systems for missile defense.
e. The GCC’s theater counterair effort, and especially the missile defense planning and
actions, should be coordinated and synchronized with those of the GCCs in other theaters
and the worldwide synchronizing headquarters for missile defense planning, United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and its subordinate Joint Functional Component
Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD).
f. OCA and DCA operations require sharing many of the same systems (i.e., sensors,
weapons, and C2), so integration of the component assets, as well as synchronization of their
use, is necessary for unity of effort.
4. Air and Missile Threats
a. Potential adversary air and missile threats continue to grow in numbers and
capabilities. Expanded technology and proliferation of missiles, including cruise missiles
(CMs), BMs, and air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), expand the scope and complexity of
protecting friendly forces and vital interests. The regional threats from short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (IRBMs) are clear and present where the US deploys forces and maintains
security relationships, and those threats are growing at a rapid pace. The proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), coupled with a conventional means of delivery (i.e.,
aircraft, CMs, or BMs), greatly increases potential lethality of any adversary and elevates the
importance of maintaining robust counterair capabilities to protect US and friendly forces
and areas. The US, while protecting some allies and partners, also works to enable them to
defend themselves against the air and missile threats.
b. Other trends also complicate the counterair mission. The detection capabilities,
engagement ranges, mobility, and lethality of SAM systems and fighter aircraft have
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