JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Executive Summary
their theaters and adjacent areas of interest, and assess the
vulnerability to cross-AOR threats from outside an
established JOA/theater of operations.
ID and Tracking
Area Air Defense
Planning
Ballistic Missile Defense
Planning
DCA Operations
Execution of efficient DCA operations requires a
continuous surveillance and reporting system capable of
NRT production and dissemination of the tracking data
necessary for effective decision making. As a track is
detected, it is identified and labeled and this information is
disseminated as rapidly as possible. The track data
provided is sufficiently detailed and timely to allow
decision makers to evaluate the track, determine the
significance of the threat, and either designate DCA forces
for interception or engagement or advise units of the
passage of friendly aircraft.
Development of the AADP and planning DCA operations
involves integrating friendly force capabilities and
limitations against adversary vulnerabilities to achieve
optimum results in a dynamic tactical environment.
Weapon engagement zones (WEZs) are a critical part of
DCA planning because they represent part of the current
defense posture against the air and missile threats. Defense
against BMs, CMs, ASMs, and aircraft each have unique
requirements for active air defenses. During planning,
multiple options should be developed using various
combinations of weapon systems and WEZs allowing the
flexibility to defend all critical assets, although there may
be resources shortfalls.
GCCs should locate, identify, and assess potential BM
threats. To facilitate JFC planning, and specifically missile
defense planning, those GCCs should produce target
folders for potential missile threats. Target folders should
be available for a subordinate JFC to complete and use
when necessary, including for TSTs. For the joint force,
the commander, Army air and missile defense command
(normally the deputy area air defense commander) and
commander, task force integrated AMD, and their staffs are
acknowledged subject matter experts regarding the BM
threat and missile defense. They can support OCA
planners to help eliminate the threat and DCA planners to
defend against it.
The AADP reflects the JFC’s objectives, priorities, and the
specific need for air superiority and protection, and the
appropriate component commanders provide the surface-,
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