JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
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Comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Control<br />
SECTION C. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS AND FUNCTIONS<br />
14. General<br />
Joint counterair operations require reliable C2 capabilities that allow the<br />
JFC/JFACC/AADC, component comm<strong>and</strong>ers, <strong>and</strong> subordinate forces to integrate <strong>and</strong><br />
synchronize/deconflict OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA operations. Effective C2 systems facilitate<br />
centralized planning <strong>and</strong> direction <strong>and</strong> decentralized execution, helping comm<strong>and</strong>ers to<br />
synchronize geographically separated operations into a unified action. C2 systems must<br />
support OCA operations while at the same time detecting, identifying, <strong>and</strong> tracking threats in<br />
order to warn, cue, <strong>and</strong> coordinate DCA assets, including providing accurate warnings of<br />
enemy missile launches <strong>and</strong> impact points.<br />
Refer to <strong>JP</strong> 6-0, Joint Communications System, for details regarding planning<br />
communications systems for joint operations.<br />
15. Requirements, Infrastructure, <strong>and</strong> Resources<br />
a. Requirements. The C2 systems should be capable of rapidly exchanging<br />
information, interfacing among components, <strong>and</strong> displaying a CTP to all participating<br />
components. The components typically are tasked to provide a CTP. The components’<br />
CTPs <strong>and</strong> information from the joint planning network contribute to a GCC’s COP. The<br />
information flow should be as complete, reliable, secure, <strong>and</strong> as near real time (NRT) as<br />
possible to support comm<strong>and</strong>ers’ decision-making cycles. These systems should be flexible<br />
enough to allow NRT retasking <strong>and</strong> coordination for attacks on TSTs. The C2 architecture<br />
among all levels of comm<strong>and</strong> should be survivable, interoperable, flexible, secure, <strong>and</strong><br />
redundant to the maximum extent possible. C2 integration includes communications <strong>and</strong><br />
data links for sensors, weapons systems, staffs <strong>and</strong> liaisons, <strong>and</strong> supporting agencies.<br />
Effective C2 systems support unity of effort during counterair operations by enabling<br />
comm<strong>and</strong>ers to fuse disparate databases <strong>and</strong> geographically separated offensive <strong>and</strong><br />
defensive operations into a single COP/CTP that enhances situational awareness <strong>and</strong><br />
underst<strong>and</strong>ing. For every operational element involved in counterair the C2 family of<br />
systems must support the following:<br />
(1) Rapid communications <strong>and</strong> coordination links <strong>and</strong> procedures.<br />
(2) Data fusion <strong>and</strong> decision-making nodes.<br />
(3) Warning <strong>and</strong> cueing systems.<br />
(4) Links to dedicated weapons systems, other MNF partners, <strong>and</strong>/or civilian<br />
authorities.<br />
(5) Vertical, horizontal, technical, <strong>and</strong> procedural interoperability. Counterair C2<br />
processes are built using existing joint <strong>and</strong> Service systems <strong>and</strong> capabilities.<br />
b. Infrastructure. The C2 infrastructure should consist of interoperable systems that<br />
provide complete coverage for an integrated diverse force spread across a theater/JOA<br />
II-19