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JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

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Comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Control<br />

SECTION C. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS AND FUNCTIONS<br />

14. General<br />

Joint counterair operations require reliable C2 capabilities that allow the<br />

JFC/JFACC/AADC, component comm<strong>and</strong>ers, <strong>and</strong> subordinate forces to integrate <strong>and</strong><br />

synchronize/deconflict OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA operations. Effective C2 systems facilitate<br />

centralized planning <strong>and</strong> direction <strong>and</strong> decentralized execution, helping comm<strong>and</strong>ers to<br />

synchronize geographically separated operations into a unified action. C2 systems must<br />

support OCA operations while at the same time detecting, identifying, <strong>and</strong> tracking threats in<br />

order to warn, cue, <strong>and</strong> coordinate DCA assets, including providing accurate warnings of<br />

enemy missile launches <strong>and</strong> impact points.<br />

Refer to <strong>JP</strong> 6-0, Joint Communications System, for details regarding planning<br />

communications systems for joint operations.<br />

15. Requirements, Infrastructure, <strong>and</strong> Resources<br />

a. Requirements. The C2 systems should be capable of rapidly exchanging<br />

information, interfacing among components, <strong>and</strong> displaying a CTP to all participating<br />

components. The components typically are tasked to provide a CTP. The components’<br />

CTPs <strong>and</strong> information from the joint planning network contribute to a GCC’s COP. The<br />

information flow should be as complete, reliable, secure, <strong>and</strong> as near real time (NRT) as<br />

possible to support comm<strong>and</strong>ers’ decision-making cycles. These systems should be flexible<br />

enough to allow NRT retasking <strong>and</strong> coordination for attacks on TSTs. The C2 architecture<br />

among all levels of comm<strong>and</strong> should be survivable, interoperable, flexible, secure, <strong>and</strong><br />

redundant to the maximum extent possible. C2 integration includes communications <strong>and</strong><br />

data links for sensors, weapons systems, staffs <strong>and</strong> liaisons, <strong>and</strong> supporting agencies.<br />

Effective C2 systems support unity of effort during counterair operations by enabling<br />

comm<strong>and</strong>ers to fuse disparate databases <strong>and</strong> geographically separated offensive <strong>and</strong><br />

defensive operations into a single COP/CTP that enhances situational awareness <strong>and</strong><br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing. For every operational element involved in counterair the C2 family of<br />

systems must support the following:<br />

(1) Rapid communications <strong>and</strong> coordination links <strong>and</strong> procedures.<br />

(2) Data fusion <strong>and</strong> decision-making nodes.<br />

(3) Warning <strong>and</strong> cueing systems.<br />

(4) Links to dedicated weapons systems, other MNF partners, <strong>and</strong>/or civilian<br />

authorities.<br />

(5) Vertical, horizontal, technical, <strong>and</strong> procedural interoperability. Counterair C2<br />

processes are built using existing joint <strong>and</strong> Service systems <strong>and</strong> capabilities.<br />

b. Infrastructure. The C2 infrastructure should consist of interoperable systems that<br />

provide complete coverage for an integrated diverse force spread across a theater/JOA<br />

II-19

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