JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Chapter IV
Refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for a discussion of targeting and TSTs.
8. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
a. SEAD is activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based
enemy ADs by destructive or disruptive means. SEAD must be an integral part of all
planning and air operations, but the SEAD requirement will vary according to mission
objectives, system capabilities, and threat complexity. SEAD operations are based upon the
JAOP and the components’ suppression needs, target priorities, and availability of SEAD
assets.
b. SEAD objectives are specified by the JFC, who will consider the unique capabilities
of each component to contribute to counterair operations. Traditionally, there are three
categories of SEAD, each of which reduces attrition and creates more favorable conditions
for friendly air operations: AOR-/JOA-wide joint AD system suppression, localized
suppression, and opportune suppression. For each category, there are two means of
executing SEAD, destructive and disruptive.
c. SEAD assets are often used in conjunction with other air operations/missions (i.e., air
interdiction, OCA attack, airborne operations) when surface ADs are a factor. Specially
trained aircrew and specially equipped aircraft are designed for SEAD missions, especially
against an IADS. SEAD dedicated aircraft normally are equipped with special electronic
detection and electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment, deceptive expendables (chaff,
flares, or decoys), and antiradiation missiles (ARMs) for use against emitting radars. During
major operations, SEAD assets normally are too valuable to be used for missions without a
SEAD requirement. Other fighter-attack and multi-role fighter crews normally are trained to
support the SEAD mission, especially against the enemy AD infrastructure.
d. Threat. AD threats can encompass many national or multinational systems normally
integrated into an IADS. Potential adversaries’ IADSs have become increasingly complex
and can differ widely from country to country in terms of organization, sophistication, and
operational procedures. An adversary’s IADS needs to be analyzed in-depth with an eye to
potential strengths and weaknesses, especially seams in coverage. The goal is to identify
command structure, AD doctrine, early warning and tracking capabilities, C2
reliability/redundancy, and defensive weapons systems. SEAD operations target the
following components of an IADS:
(1) IADS C2 nodes/centers.
(2) SAM sites.
(3) AAA.
(4) Early warning and fire control radars and GCI sites.
(5) SAM carriers and storage bunkers.
(6) AD operations and maintenance personnel.
IV-12 JP 3-01