JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
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Chapter I<br />
(b) Suppression of Enemy <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Defense</strong>s (SEAD). Activity that neutralizes,<br />
destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses (AD) by destructive<br />
<strong>and</strong>/or disruptive means.<br />
(c) Fighter Escort. Fighter escort includes providing dedicated protection<br />
sorties by air-to-air capable fighters in support of other offensive air <strong>and</strong> air support<br />
operations over enemy territory or in a DCA role to protect aircraft such as high value<br />
airborne assets (HVAAs).<br />
(d) Fighter Sweep. Fighter sweep is an offensive mission by fighter aircraft to<br />
seek out <strong>and</strong> destroy enemy aircraft or targets of opportunity in a designated area.<br />
Detailed discussions of these missions can be found in Chapter IV, “Offensive Counterair<br />
Planning <strong>and</strong> Operations.”<br />
b. Defensive Counterair. DCA is all defensive measures designed to detect, identify,<br />
intercept, <strong>and</strong> neutralize or destroy enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through<br />
friendly airspace. DCA includes both active <strong>and</strong> passive AMD measures to protect friendly<br />
forces, critical assets, population centers, infrastructure, etc., <strong>and</strong> deny enemy freedom of<br />
action in friendly airspace. The goal of DCA operations, in concert with OCA operations, is<br />
to provide an area from which forces can operate while protected from air <strong>and</strong> missile<br />
threats. DCA operations must be integrated <strong>and</strong> synchronized with OCA operations <strong>and</strong> all<br />
other joint force operations.<br />
Further discussion of responsibilities for developing weapons control procedures <strong>and</strong><br />
airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) can be found in Chapter III, “Counterair<br />
Planning.”<br />
(1) Active <strong>Air</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Missile</strong> <strong>Defense</strong>. Active AMD is direct defensive action taken<br />
to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of air <strong>and</strong> missile threats against friendly<br />
forces <strong>and</strong> assets. It includes the use of aircraft, AD weapons, missile defense weapons,<br />
electronic warfare (EW), multiple sensors, <strong>and</strong> other available weapons/capabilities. Ideally,<br />
integration of those systems will allow for a defense in depth, with the potential for multiple<br />
engagements that increase the probability for success. <strong>Air</strong> <strong>and</strong> ballistic missile defenses<br />
(BMDs) should be closely integrated to form an essential capability within DCA. While AD<br />
is defensive measures designed to destroy attacking aircraft or missiles in the atmosphere, or<br />
to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack, BMD is recognized as unique because of<br />
the significance of the ballistic missile (BM) threat <strong>and</strong> the difficulty of the defense. The<br />
integration of these elements provides for an integrated air defense system (IADS) that is<br />
unique to each JFC <strong>and</strong> contributes to defense in depth, with the potential for multiple<br />
engagements that increase the probability for success.<br />
(2) Passive <strong>Air</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Missile</strong> <strong>Defense</strong>. Passive AMD is all measures, other than<br />
active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air <strong>and</strong> missile threats against<br />
friendly forces <strong>and</strong> assets. These measures include detection, warning, camouflage,<br />
concealment, deception, dispersion, <strong>and</strong> the use of protective construction. Passive AMD<br />
improves survivability by reducing the likelihood of detection <strong>and</strong> targeting of friendly assets<br />
I-4 <strong>JP</strong> 3-<strong>01</strong>