JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Chapter III
minimizing duplication of effort and the potential for fratricide/friendly fire while providing
necessary flexibility to engage.
b. The current SROE recognizes a fundamental difference between the two sets of
supplemental measures. Measures that are reserved to the President, SecDef, or CCDRs are
generally permissive; that is, the particular operation, tactic, or weapon is generally
restricted, and the President, SecDef, or CCDR approves the supplemental measure to
specifically permit the particular operation, tactic, or weapon. In contrast, the remainder of
the supplemental ROE measures (i.e., those delegated to subordinate commanders) are all
restrictive in nature. Absent implementation of supplemental measures, commanders are
generally allowed to use any weapon or tactic available and to employ reasonable force to
accomplish the mission, without having to get permission first. Only when enacted will
these supplemental ROE measures restrict a particular operation, tactic, or weapon.
c. ROE may be permissive or restrictive, depending on the circumstances. For example,
ROE may allow use of BVR weapons to engage hostile targets as early as possible.
Permissive ROE would entail instructions directing decentralized execution by the joint
force to immediately engage any incoming BMs. However, that same ROE may restrict
retaliatory or preemptive attacks against the launcher that may result in its destruction but
permit the use of nonlethal capabilities that disable or neutralize the launch system. JFCs
may elect to include any category of CM or antiship missiles for accelerated engagement as
the situation warrants.
d. When developing their ROE recommendations, commanders and staffs must
coordinate with their staff judge advocates (SJAs) for compliance with US and customary
international law, as well as treaties and conventions to which the US is a signatory. Once
the ROE are approved, commanders, assisted by their SJAs, are responsible for promulgating
the ROE and ensuring that all subordinate forces understand the ROE. Commanders must
also maintain close coordination with the public affairs office to ensure their awareness of
any command or strategic messaging considerations.
e. Lower echelon MNFCs and local HN commanders may lack the authority to speak on
behalf of their nations in the ROE development process. Complete consensus or
standardization of ROE should be sought, but obtaining concurrence for ROE from other
national authorities can be a time-consuming process.
f. US forces participating in MNF operations will follow the ROE established by the
MNFC if authorized by SecDef. US forces will be under the control of an MNFC only if
SecDef determines that the ROE for that MNF are consistent with the policy guidance on
unit self-defense and with the rules of individual self-defense contained in the SROE/SRUF.
If the MNFC has not issued ROE, US forces will operate under the SROE/SRUF.
11. General
SECTION D. IDENTIFICATION
a. ID is the process of determining the friendly or hostile character of an unknown
detected contact and the product (classification) of that process. Assigning ID requires ID
III-12 JP 3-01